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ABSTRACT 
SOME ISSUES OF REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING IN LIBYA 
Mansour M. El-Babour, A.M. 
Boston University Graduate School, 1976 
Major Professor: Robert c. Mayfield, Professor of Geography 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the issues of 
regional development as they relate to a classic problem of 
underdevelopment, namely, the dualism of the space economy. 
The reversal of regional imbalance becomes a complex problem 
because the polarizing process is historically conditioned 
and is deeply ingrained into the structural economy. Accord-
ingly, the present study of regional development in Libya 
started with a historical analysis of the space economy; 
Understanding of the historical evolution of regional eco-
nomic relations is essential for the contemporary purposes of 
formulating development plans for modern Libya. 
Against a painful background of poverty resulting from 
historical influences and geographical constraints, the Libygn 
economy has experienced the "oil boom" of the Sixties. 
Since then, Libya has been characterized by a large capital 
surplus, as it became one of the major oil producing and 
iv 
exporting nations of the world. 
However, despite the abundance of capital the economy 
still reflects the classic structural traits of underdevelop-
ment, i.e., sectoral imbalance and overdependence on a single 
product. While the oil industry has been developed extensively, 
other sectors of the economy remained comparatively less 
developed. In addition to that, the new oil wealth initiated 
the following problems: 1) the extension of a modern market 
economy into the traditional subsistence economy, disrupting 
the life-styles and the population base of the latter; 2) a 
widening gap between the rapidly growing modern cities and 
the stagnation or slow growth in rural areas; and 3) increased 
rural-to-urban migration~ 
Given the fact that oil is an extractive economy of a 
nonrenewable resource, this research stresses the need for 
regional population policies that would link the exploitation 
of oil with areally dispersed industrial and agricultural acti-
vities.' ·-.,In this respect, population data from 1954 to 1973 
were analyzed in order to identify the growing and declining 
regions. This analysis was supplemented by a spatial analysis 
of hierarchical service-centers in order to identify the gaps 
in space and in the hierarchical order. The results of this 
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Thjs thesis begins with a review of the existing litera-
ture on regional development as it relat:es to a classic prob-
lem of underdevelopment, namely, the dualism of the space 
economy. In the case of Libya, we will analyze the possible 
impact of the sudden influx of oil revenues on what is a 
sparsely populated country with a low capital absorption 
capacity. Specifically, we will examine the population 
changes resulting from the impact of oil revenues. Finally, 
we will develop some simple but useful measures for examining 
the issue of regional population planning in Libya. 
The foundations of regional economic disparities in 
Libya were laid early in the period of foreign domination. 
Throughout that period the space economy exhibited a marked 
urban-rural duality. Export-oriented, modern European colon-
ialism stimulated the coastal towns, continuing a trend that 
had actually started during an earlier period of Roman and 
Greek influence and conquest. As a result, the interior 
towns and rural areas declined and their inhabitants never 
advanced beyond subsistence levels of living. 
When Libya became an independent state in 1951, it was 
considered the prototype of a poor country. There were almost 
1 
2 
no known natural resources other than land. The usable area 
hardly exceeded 5 percent of the total area of the country. 
Even this area suffered from shortages of water, soil erosion, 
and poor communication. Per capita income was under $50 per 
year, and there was no skilled labor or indigenous entrepre-
neurship. In general, the level of development was very low. 
It is against this background of the historical and geo-
graphical forces of the Libyan economic development, that we 
must view what is commonly called the "oil boom" of the Six-
ties. Since then, i;p.e Libyan economy has be>3n.charact.e;r-ized 
by a.large capital ·surplus, as Libya became one of the major 
oil..:.produciri.g.and exporting nations of the world. 
The effect of the fast growing oil sector on the rest 
of the economy has been fundamental. It gave rise to an 
unprecedented flow of revenues accruing to the govenunent with 
a monopoly on the income. The surplus income enabled the 
country to adopt planning for conscious economic development 
so as to rationalize the exploitation of its limited poten-
tialities. 
However, despite the abundance of capital, the economy 
still reflects the classic structural traits of underdevelop-
ment, i.e., sectoral imbalance and overdependence on a single 
product. More important, the introduction of the new oil 
wealth added another dimension to the already existing dis-
parities between regions. It has in fact aggravated the 
3 
historical urban-rural duality. In particular, it initiated 
the following problems: 
1) the extension of a modern market economy into the 
traditional subsistence economy, disrupting the 
life-styles and the population base of the latter; 
2) a widening gap between the rapidly growing cities and 
the stagnation or slow growth in rural areas; 
3) increased rural-urban migration. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of 
rapid economic growth on urban and regional development in 
Libya, in general, and in its northeastern part, in particu-
lar. In more detailed terms, the study will attempt to do 
the following: 
l) to review the economic conditions in the country 
before the discovery of oil, and to trace the origins 
of regional dualism; 
2) to consider the nature of the economic development 
during the petroleum period, and how the modern econo-
my has aggravated rather than reduced the disparity 
between the urban and rural sectors of the economy; 
3) to examine in detail the pattern of population dis-
tribution as a manifestation of the urban-rural 
dicho~omy, refered ~o earlier, in order ~hat we may 
suggest some measures for regional population planning. 
4 
The latter is accomplished by examing a "transitional 
diagram" of population change and by investigating 
some aspects of the service-center hierarchy in 
northeastern Libya. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
1. An Introductory Note 
In the theory of economic development, attention is 
usually focused on the dual nature of the economies of the 
developing countries. These economies are usually held to 
be comprised of two sectors: a traditional sector engaged 
in subsistence agriculture, and a modern sector based on 
export and the use of technology. These sectors ~xist inde-
pendently, yet side by side, in the developing country. 
" ••• progress and tradition may dwell in close spatial 
proximity by simply fastening on different human groups and 
economic activities that exist side by side."1 The term 
"dualism" is used to contrast the various economic and social 
differences that exist between the backward and more advanced 
sectors of the developing countries. This concept forms the 
basis of some of the most important recent theories of the 
2 growth process. 
1Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Develop-
ment (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 184. 
2Robert E. Baldwin, Economic Development and Growth 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), pp. 66-67. 
5 
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2. The Concept of Regional Inequality 
The concept of inequality is essential to an understand-
ing of the spread of economic development in an area. Regions 
of a country do not develop at the same speed. A few 
points of growth are first established, from which develop-
ment spreads over the country. Myrdal, 3 supported by Hirsch-
man,4 made an important contribution to economic development 
theory by introducing an emphasis upon regional economic 
inequalities. According to him, they are generated during 
the early stages of development through the operation of cir-
cular or cumulative causation. 5 He has devised two terms for 
this purpose; the "spread effects" and the "backwash effects." 
These coincide with the effects mentioned by Hirschman; the 
"trickling-down effects" and the "polarization effects." 
Myrdal points out that expansion in one locality has backwash 
effects in other localities: 
More specifically the movements of labor, 
capital, goods and services do not by them-
selves counteract the natural tendency to 
regional inequality. By themselves, migra-
tion, capital movements and trade are rather 
the media through which the cumulative pro-
cess evolves - upward in the lucky regions 
3Gunnar Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World 
Prosperity (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957). 
4Hirschman, op. cit., 
5 Myrdal, op. cit., p. 12. 
6 
and downward in the unlucky ones. 
7 
According to Myrdal, the play of the forces in the mar-
ket normally tends to increase, rather than decrease, the 
inequalities between regions. If things were left to market 
forces, unhampered by any policy interferences, economic 
activities wou:ld cluster in certain localiti.es. and ;r-egions, 
leaving the rest of the country in a state of stagnation. 
The expansion of economic development in space is accomplished 
through certain centrifugal "spread effects" of expansionary 
momentum, from the centers of economic growth to other regions.7 
1'[yrdaJ. linlcs a higher level o:f economic development 
in a country with stronger spread effects. He also attri-
butes much of the problem of a low average level of develop-
ment in an underdeveloped country to the fact that spread 
effects there are weak, and that the free play of market 
forces tends to create regional inequalities. 8 
Hirschman (1958) explains the same concept of regional 
dualism, what he calls the north-south problem. 9 He points 
out that once economic progress appears in any area, powerful 
6Ibid., p. 27. 
7Myrdal, op. cit., p. 31. 
8Ibid., p. 34. 
9Hirschman called "North" the region which has been 
experiencing growth and "South" the one that has remained behind. 
8 
forces tend to operate, making for a spatial concentration of 
economic growth around the initial starting points. 10 Hirsch-
man stresses the need for the emergence of "growing points" 
or "growth poles" in the course of the development process. 
This inevitably leads to an interregional inequality of 
growth, which establishes the distinction between the "growth 
points" and the "lagging regions" of the country. According 
to Hirschman, the gap created between the two is gradually 
reduced through "trickling down" effects that are favorable 
for the poor region. This occurs when the richer region 
starts interacting with the poorer one through increased 
"Northern" purchases and investments in the "South." 
This effect is very likely to occur if a certain degree 
of complementarity exists between the two regions. However, 
in the absence of such complementarity, unfavorable or "polar-
ization effects" will tend to be the stronger of the two. 
These polarization effects take place when the activities in 
the poor region suffer from the competition of the richer 
region and ~he best elements of the labor force of the poor 
region migrate toward the richer one: 
A most serious, and frequently observed, 
polarization effect consists in the kind 
of internal migration that may follow upon 
the economic advances of the North. Instead 
of absorbing the disguised unemployment, 
:tforthern progress may denude the South 
lOH. hm . 183 1rsc an, op. c1t., p. . 
of its key technicians and managers as well 
as of the more enterprising young men.ll 
The above theories rely on economic growth from outside. 
9 
However, there are some other theories that stress the motive 
forces of the process of development within a region. 
3. Export-base Theory 
This theory explains the development of a reigon through 
the external demand·for its natural resources and activities. 
The theory has its background in urban economics, or the 
study of the economic base of a city or region. The economic-
base concept implies that the basis for the growth of a region 
relies on those activities that allow it to pay for its 
imports. These activities may range from agriculture to 
transport, or the exploitation of favorable natural resources, 
such as oil and natural gas supplies. Walter Isard, who asso-
ciated the regional multiplier analysis with economic base 
studies, points out that: 
The economic-base type of analysis distin-
guishes between basic (primary) industry and 
service (nonbasic or residential) industry. 
• . . the reason for the existence and growth 
of a region--whether it is a community or a 
small resource area at one extreme or a huge 
metropolitan or resource region at the other 
extreme--lies in the goods and services it 
produces locally but sells beyond its borders. 
These "basic" activities not only provide the 
means of payment for raw materials, food, and 
11
rbid. 1 P• 188. 
manufactured products which the region can-
not produce itself but also support the 
"service" activities, which are principally 
local in productive scope and market areas.l2 
10 
13 . 14 North,··.' and T1ebout, among others, have contributed 
to the export-base theory. They see that the exploitation 
of the natural resources of a region will increase its 
exports. The resulting export surplus will increase its pro-
pensity for importation. North has examined the significance 
of the export base for a region's economic growth and noted 
that "this growth is closely tied to the success of its 
exports and may take place either as a result of the improved 
position of existing exports relative to competing areas or 
as a result of the development of new exports." 15 He stressed 
the role of exports in shaping the pattern of urbanization. 
and nodal centers: "Nodes grow up because of special loca-
tional advantages that lower the transfer and processing 
costs of exportable commodities. Nodal centers become trading 
12
walter Isard, Methods of Regional Analysis: An Intro-
duction to Regional Science (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. 
Press, 1960), p. 190. 
13
nouglass c. North, "Location Theory and Regional Eco-
nomic Growth," in John Friedmann and William Alonso (eds.), 
Regional Development and Planning (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 240~255. 
14
charles M. Tiebout, "Exports and Regional Economic 
Growth," in Friedmann and Alonso, Ibid., pp. 256-260. 
15North, op. cit., p. 248. 
11 
centers through which exports leave the region and imports 
16 
enter for distribution throughout the area." The 
increased imports will stimulate new activities. Thus, a 
cumulative process will be created, and the continuation of 
this process will bring about external economies, attracting 
a new class of industries. 
Tiebout pointed out some implications for the theory of 
regional growth. Although he acknowledged that exports are 
not the only source of regional income, he maintained that 
"a region will develop if it can compete with other regions 
in the exports market •.. it is the ability to develop an 
export base which determines regional growth." 17 The devel-
opment process of the region will continue if it can diversify 
i im exports. But, if the natural resources are of the 
exhaustive type, the development of the region may decline 
once the resources are exhausted. In addition, there remains 
the danger of a sudden change in the structure of demand, 
which will lead to the same result. 
Hilhorst18 added another possible check on the potential 
·effects of the exports sector: "It may be that the socio-
16Ibid., p. 248. 
17Tiebout, op. cit., pp. 259-260. 
18J. Hilhorst, "Regional Development Theory: An Attempt 
to Synthesize," in Multidisciplinary Aspects of Regional DeveloP-
ment : Annual Meeting of Directors of Development Research· 
Ins~itutes, Montpellier, 1968. 
12 
political structure of the region does not allow the multi-
plier effects to take place, because it imposes an income 
distribution which is not conducive to the establishment of 
new industries." 19 Thus, for regional growth to be success-
ful, the economic possibilities for diversification should 
exist and the socio-political structure should allow for it. 
4. The Theory of the Stages of Growth 
Others have attempted to outline a more general theory 
of development. 20 Their theory is based on the following 
premise: as income rises, the proportion of the labor force 
employed in agriculture declines and the demand for primary 
commodities goes down. At the same time, the proportion of 
employment in manufacturing activities rises as new demands 
arise, especially for products corning from the secondary and 
tertiary sectors. 
The theory states that a regional economy goes through a 
sequence of stages, from a subsistence economy to the intro-
duction of highly specialized services: 
1) a stage of self-sufficient subsistence economy; 
2) growth through production specialization in primary 
19Ibid., p. 26. 
20 Harvey S. Perloff 
nomic Growth (Baltimore: 
et al., Regions, Resources and Eco-
Johns Hopkins Press, 1960). 
13 
activities and interregional trade--this can be 
expected to accompany improvements in transport; 
3) the introduction of "secondary" industries (mining 
and manufacturing) as well as the necessary social 
overhead facilities and services to support them; 
4) a shift to more diversified industrialization based 
on internal industrial linkages and rising incomes; 
and, finally, 
5) specialization in certain tertiary industries for 
export, including the export of capital, specialized 
personnel, and services to less advanced regions. 21 
The above theory--usually called the "sector theory"--
. 22 
follows the lines established by Rostow. He developed a 
model which suggests that each country passes through a ser-
ies of comparable stages of development: 
1) the traditional society 
2} the preconditions for take-off 
3) the take-off 
1> the drive to maturity, and 
5) the age of high mass consumption. 23 
21Ibid., p. 59. 
22w. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971). 
23
rbid., p. 4. 
14 
The key stage is "take-off," the period during which an 
economy attains self-sustaining growth. Take-off generally 
follows the achievements of critical rates of growth in 
important sectors of the economy. According to Rostow, a 
society that. approache& take-off·is a society that has·al?eady 
experienced basic structural changes in its social and 
political environment: 
. I 
During the take-off new industries expand 
rapidly, yielding profits, a large propor-
tion of which are reinvested in new plants; 
and these new industries, in turn, stimulate, 
through their rapidly expanding requirement 
for factory workers, the services to support 
them, and for other manufactured goods, a 
further expansion in urban areas and in other 
modern industrial plants. • . . In a decade 
or two both the basic structure of the econo-
my and the social and political structure of 
the society are transformed in such a way 
that a steady rate of growth can be, there-
after, regularly sustained.24 
On commenting on Rostow's stages-analysis, Baldwin noted 
that although historical experience seems to verify the vari-
ous sequences suggested by Rostow, there does not appear to 
be any one stage sequence that applies to a broad sweep of· 
- 25 development experience. Baldwin also pointed to the inade-
quacy of the Rostow model in dealing with the dual character 
of the developing countries. It seems clear that interactions 
between agricultural and industrial sectors are at the core 
24 b"d 8 I l. • I p. . 
25 ld . "t 79 Ba wJ.n, op. cJ. ., p. • 
15 
of the development process, especially in the transition from 
a poor and stagnant country to a rapidly developing one. Yet, 
according to Baldwin, Rostow's theory provides no explicit 
analysis of these interactions: 
From Rostow's theory we get the impression 
that a country should turn to rigorous in-
dustrial development efforts only after agri-
culture has been modernized and the stock of 
social overhead capital greatly increased. 
Yet, postwar growth experience in the devel-
oping countries has convinced more and more 
economists that the agricultural and indus-
trial sectors must expand side by side if 
growth is to be more than the establishment 
of a few flashyindustries or the creation of 
an agricultural surplus that soon disappears 
into a larger rural population.26 
However, the stages-theory helps to explain the tendency 
for urbanization as a result of the specialization of agri-
culture and a decrease in the relative importance of this 
sector in the economy of a region. Locational factors, such 
as transport cost, will stimulate industrial clusters, which 
will in turn require urban services: 
The emerging transport and marketing facilities 
will converge at points of best access to all 
production and consumption points in the region 
and will form urban nuclei there. Regional, 
political, administrative, and manufacturing 
functions will be attracted to these nuclei 
which, according to the diversification of 
functions and the scale of their market areas, 
will make up the different levels in the urban 
hierarchy of the region. At some stage, cer-
tain regional activities will become competitive 
26 b"d 8 Il..,p. 0. 
on the national or international market and 
will thereby create an additional export base 
for the region which may accelerate its devel-
opment relative to others. • . • The emerg-
ing urban centers become locations of intensive 
information exchange and thereby have a higher 
innovation potential than their hinterlands.27 
5. Models of the Development of the Space Economy 
John Friedmann views regional theory as the spatial 
16 
incidence of economic growth. In his book, Regional Develop-
ment Policy, 28 he tries to synthesize and add to the current 
literature on the subject by stating the following interre-
lated propositions: 
l) Regional economies are open to the outside world and 
subject to external influences. 
2) Regional economic growth is externally induced. 
3) Successful translation of the export sector growth 
into the growth of the residentiary sector depends on 
the sociopolitical structure of the region and the 
local distribution of the income and patterns of 
expendi tuxe. 
4) Local leadership is decisive for successful adaptation 
27
walter B. Stohr, Interurban Systems and Regional Eco-
nomic Development. Commission on college Geography Resource 
Paper No. 26 (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geo-
graphers, 1974), p. 12. 
28John Friedmann, Regional Development Policy: A Case 
Study of Venezuela (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966). 
17 
to external change._ Nevertheless, the quality 
of leadership depends on the region's past develop-
ment experience. 
5) Regional economic growth may be regarded, in part, as 
a problem in the location of firms. 
6) Economic growth tends to occur in the matrix of urban 
regions. It is through this matrix that the evolving 
space economy is organized. 
7) Flows of labor tend to exert an equilibrating force 
on the welfare effects of economic growth. However, 
contradictory results may be obtained. 
8) Where economic growth is sustained over long periods, 
its incidence works toward a progressive integration 
29 
of the space economy. 
Of the above eight propositions, two are particularly 
relevant to the present study. First, "Economic growth tends 
to occur in the matrix of urban regions. It is through this 
matrix that the evolving space economy is organized." 
Researchers have often noted that the town is the gateway for 
developing countries: "Cities provide concentrations of 
population from which industrial labor may be drawn; they also 
contain a greater variety of skills and resources than do 
29 - . -Ibid., pp. 20-38. 
18 
rural areas • . . cities typically tend to favor a propensity 
to analyze traditional institut.ions and to innovate and 
accept. change.~0 Elaborating on the above proposition, Berry 
added: "Cities organize the space economy. They are centers 
of activity and innovation, focal points of the transport net-
work, locations of superior acc~essibility at which firms can 
most easily reap scale economies and at which industrial com-
plexes can obtain the economies of localization and urbaniza-
tion."31 
According to Isard, "urbanization economies," or exter-
nal economies, result from the juxtaposition of firms: 
These are usually defined as economies which 
emerge when unlike plants congregate around 
one site, that is, are spatially juxtaposed 
rather than geographically separated. Fre-
quently these economies are closely linked 
with regional develo:;>ment processes and may 
be properly termed u:rbanization-regionali-
zation economies.32 
Friedmann regarded economic activities as ordered in 
space through: 
301rma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, Economic Growth 
and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford, Cali-
fornia: Stanford University Press, 1973), p. 21. 
31Brian J.L. Berry, "Relationships Between Regional Eco-
nomic Development and the Urban System--The Case of Chile," 
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geog., vol. 60, 
pp. 283-307. 
32 Isard, op. cit., p. 404. 
19 
a) A system of cities arranged in a hierarchy, according 
to the functions performed by each city. 
b) The corresponding areas of influence, or urban fields, 
that surround each of the urban centers in the system. 
This system of spatial organization undergoes change with 
economic growth at any point within it. 33 Friedmann concluded 
his proposition by presenting several hypotheses that 
could apply to a uniform area in terms of population, 
resources, and income distribution: 
a) The population of an urban field will be proportional 
to the population of the central city; thus large 
cities will control larger dependent populations, 
distributed over larger areas. 
b) The spatial incidence of economic growth is a function 
of distance from a central city; thus, economic growth 
will be more intense in the proximity of cities. 
c) The growth potential of an area, situated along an 
axis between two cities, is a function of the density 
of interaction between them; thus, economic activities 
will tend to be drawn into an axis roughly in proper-
tion to the product of the populations of each city, 
divided by some function of the distance separating 
them. 
33F ' dm . 30 r1e ann, op. c1t., p. . 
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d) Impulses of economic change are transmitted in order, 
from higher to lower centers, in the urban hierarchy; 
thus, large cities play a key role in extending 
growth across the entire system of the space econo-
34 
my. 
The second proposition that is relevant to the present 
study is the one stating, "Where economic growth is sustained 
over long periods, its incidence works toward a progressive 
integration of the space economy." Friedmann devised a des-
criptive model showing the sequence of spatial evolution in 
four stages: 
1) A pre-industrial stage characterized by the existence 
of a number of small independent local centers. 
2) A period of incipient-industrialization characterized 
by primacy, or the domination of the space economy by 
a single urban region. Friedmann viewed primacy as 
harmful to the aspirations of the people: 
For primate cities tend to feed upon the rest 
of the nation. Instead of generating a new 
socioeconomic order and new wealth, they 
feast on what may be extracted by the sweat 
of poor, provincial labor .•.. the periph-
ery, therefore, is drained, and national 
progress will fail to occur, except as it 
accrues to a small elite of urban consumers 
at the center. 
34Ibid., p. 31. 
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3) During the third stage, the center-periphery struc-
ture is gradually transformed into a multi-nuclear 
structure as investments are focused upon a number of 
strategically located urban centers. Friedmann reg-
arded this stage as transitional to the final one. 
4) The final stage is characterized by a functionally 
interdependent system of cities. Friedmann consid-
ered as the major goals of spatial organization dur-
ing this stage of "organized complexity": national 
integration, efficiency in the location of individual 
firms, maximum potential for further growth, and mini-
mum essential interregional balances. 35 
In agreement with Friedmann's final proposition, Berry 
added: 
It is this full integration of the national 
space-economy that constitutes the 'modern' 
end of the development spectrum. Essenti-
ally, what growth theory suggests is that 
continued urban-industrial expansion in 
major central cities should lead to cata-
lytic impacts on surrounding regions. 
Growth impulses and economic advancement 
should 'trickle down' to smaller places and 
ultimately infuse dynamism into even the 
most tradition-bound peripheries.36 
35Ibid., pp. 35-37. 
36 Berry, op. cit., p. 288. 
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6. Summary Notes 
From the previous review, it is clear that for an under-
standing of regional development we need to know the nature 
of the forces working both within and outside the region. 
The economic growth of a region is affected by its spatial 
structure, reflected in its physical and activity patterns. 
These patterns refer to the spatial arrangement of human 
settlements, productive facilities, transport routes, and 
land uses. They also include the flows of capital, labor, 
commodities, and the communications that link the physical 
elements in space. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DUAL ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY 
1. An Introductory Note 
Regional dualism and spatial disparities in growth are 
common in many countries, especially those belonging to the 
developing world that are involved in the process of moderni-
zation. These two factors may exist at different levels and 
between different types of areal units: "Spatial disparities 
may exist ••• between countries (international disparities), 
between regions of a country (interregional disparities), 
between different parts of a region (e.g., center-hinterland 
disparities), or between different cities (interurban dispari-
ties)."! The effect of these conditions is usually seen in 
gaps in per capita income and in levels of living between 
regions, as "development does not affect all parts of a nation 
equally. nf 
Building upon the "Kuznets hypothesis," which holds that 
1
walter B. Stohr, Interurban Systems and Regional Econom-
ic Development, Commission on College Geography Resource 
Paper No. 26 (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Ge-
ographers, 1974), p. 3. 
2John Friedmann, Regional Development Policy: A Case 




the level of development and the degree of income inequality 
are inversely related, Gunther and Leathers stated: 
In view of the relatively low levels of 
average income in depressed areas, together 
with high rates of poverty and unemployment, 
it is plausible to expect that these 
'depressed regions' also suffer from a greater 
degree of inequality in the distribution of 
income. A number of empirical studies have 
demonstrated that in the case of developing 
nations and mP.tropolitan areas, income 
inequality tends to diminish as the level of 
income rises.3 
Economists have long recognized the existence and persistence 
of regional economic inequalities throughout the historical 
experience of many nations. 4 
2. The Colonial Experience 
2.a. Pre-European Colonization 
The foundations of regional economic disparities in Libya 
have been laid since its ancient history. For nearly three 
thousand years Libya was subjected to a succession of mili-
tary invasions that were to continue until the end of the 
3
william D. Gunther and Charles G. Leathers, "Income 
Inequality in Depressed Regions: Some Empirical Evidence," 
Land Economics 2, vol. 1 (May 1974): 176. 
4
see t:he second chapter of this thesis for a brief review 
of Myrdal's "spread effects" and "backwash effects," and 
Hirschman's "trickling-down effects" and "polarization 
effects." 
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Second World war. The Phoenicians, who arrived from Lebanon 
in 900 B.C., founded three commercial centers along the coast 
of Tripolitania- Leptis, Oea (now Tripoli), and Sabrata. 
These commercial centers soon became powerful cities, competi-
tors of the other powers of the Mediterranean. The Greeks, 
the Persians, and the Romans all tried in turn to occupy and 
influence these cities. They wanted to use them as their 
bases of operations on the African continent. The Greeks 
came to Cyrenaica in 700 B.C. They dominated the coast and 
established their "Pentapolis," or the five cities of Cyrene, 
Barce, Teuchira, Euesperides (now Benghazi), and Apolonia. 
When the cities along the Mediterranean coastline were 
in strong hands, their influence reached inland to the limits 
of cultivated land. When they were in weak hands, their influ• 
ence extended only up to the city gates, and the sands of 
the desert invaded the fertile lands surrounding them. These 
successions of outside invaders contributed to the growth of 
urban life in Libya. However, they also induced the begin-
ning of regional differences and the separation of urban and 
rural life in the country: 
The separation of urban and rural life is an 
ancient and enduring cultural feature of the 
Maghreb. In the hierarchy of settlement forms 
there is a gap between the city and the village, 
hamlet or farmstead. . . • Urban life has in 
fact only flourished under the influence of 
alien invaders--Romans, Arabs, Frenchmen--and 
it has been and remains sharply differenti-
ated from rural and tribal ways of life.S 
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The period of Arab domination, which started in 643 A.D., 
was marked at the beginning by Berber resistance, lasting 
for half a century, as well as by continuing revolt, disor-
der, and political uncertainty. As a result of these con-
flicts and wars, economic conditions in Libya fluctuated. 
However, the two dominant elements in Libyan culture origin-
ated in this period and spread throughout the area--the Mus-
lim religion and the Arabic language. And because original 
Berber resistance was overwhelmed, the foundation was laid 
for the social homogeneity of Libya. 6 
2.b. European Colonization 
In 1551 the Ottoman fleet captured Tripoli, which "began 
to emerge as a distinct political entity with claims to urban 
leadership supported by a small commercial role in the Medi-
terranean. Its evolving status led inevitably to a polari-
zation of conflict between the sedentary coastal areas, which 
5D.R. Harris, "North Africa," in B.W. Hodder and D.R. 
Harris (eds.), Africa in Transition (London: Methuen & Co., 
1967), p. 59. 
6Rawle Farley, Planning for Development in Libya: The 
Exceptional Economy in the Developing World (New York: Prae-
ger, 1971), p. 33. 
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came under its influence, and the tribal hinterland." 7 The 
Turkish domination over Libya lasted for some 360 years, 
until the Italians occupied the country in 1911. 
Thus, throughout Libya's early history, an urban-rural 
duality existed. Export-oriented Turkish and Italian coloni-
alism stimulated the coastal cities, as had the Romans and 
the Greeks earlier. As a result, the interior cities that 
had provided important trade links with African countries 
began to decline. Despite the decline in urban population 
in Turkish times to one quarter its size during the Roman era, 
the towns continued to exert their economic influence over 
the rest of the country: 
The towns continued to serve as the loci of 
foreign settlement, as central places for a 
very circumscribed hinterland, and as break-
in-bulk points both for trans-Saharan trade 
and agricultural exports. The rural areas 
remained backward, with peasant agriculture 
near the coast, and nomadic tribes inland; 
generally they were free from urban domin-
ance. a 
The people suffered considerable hardship under Ottoman 
and Italian rule. Education was almost completely neglected: 
7Jacques Rournani, "Libya and the Military Revolution," 
in I. William Zartman (ed.), Man,State, and Society in the 
Contemporary Maghrib (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 345. 
8 R.G. Hartley, "Libya: Economic Development and Demo-
graphic Responses," in J.I. Clarke and W.B. Fisher, Popula-
tions of the Middle East and North Africa (London: Univer-
sity of London Press, 1972), p. 316. 
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Whatever economic development was encouraged, was largely for 
the benefit of the foreign colonizers, especially the !tal-
ians, whose "30-year occupation of Libya represents European 
colonization at its worst." 9 There was some expansion of 
economic activity during the years of the Italian adminis-
tration. This included: public works, utilities, agricul-
tural development, and land reclamation. And yet, whatever 
the Italians achieved was at the expense of the Libyans who 
suffered heavily. As the World Bank Mission to Libya in 
1959 noted: " . the Libyans paid heavily for what the 
Italians achieved. They were pushed off some of the best 
farming land in the country, large numbers of their livestock 
were lost in the fighting (especially in Cyrenaica), and 
their traditional industries suffered from competition from 
Italian producers.• 10 
2.c. Libya After World War II 
At the end of the Second World War, Libya--which had 
suffered a great deal from the war--ranked very low in the 
scale of national income. There were almost no known natural 
9H.B. Sharabi, "Libya's Pattern of Growth," Current 
History XLIV (January 1963): 41. 
10
rnternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), Economic Development of Libya (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1960), p. 27. 
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resources, other than land, and the usable land, about 5 per-
cent of the total area, 11 was extremely limited by shortages 
of water, soil erosion, and poor communications. Human 
resources were also scarce, and the economy was deficient in 
12 
virtually every respect. 
From 1943 to 1951, Libya was governed by the British, 
in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and by the French in Fezzan. 
Each of these three regions was governed independently of the 
others. The financial and economic relations between the 
three regional economies were similar to the relations between 
independent states.13 Each of the regions had its own 
system and procedures for exports and imports, its own regu-
lation of internal economic activities, and its own currency. 
Total national income in 1950 was estimated at no more than 
15 million Libyan pounds, of which agriculture contrib~ted 
the major part. 14 
11The total area of Libya is about 680,000 square miles, 
which makes it Africa's fourth largest country. 
12Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development, Principles, 
Problems, and Policies (N~e~w~YTo~r3k~,~~w~.~W~.~N~o~r~t~o~n~&~~C~o~.~.~l~9~59), 
p. 28. 
13Bank of Libya, A Brief History of Its First Decade: 
1956-1966, Tripoli (no date), p. 10. 
14 b'd 12 I l . ' p. . 
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3. The Historical Spatial Structure as a Con-
straint to Contemporary Regional Development 
The several historical transitions that the Libyan eco-
nomic space has experienced from early settlement to the 
recent times confirm the model sketched. by Friedmar>.n. concerning 
the spatial aspects of the development of nations: 
In the course of further occupancy and settle-
ment, spatial differentiation proceeds, as 
each regional economy acquires its own char-
acteristic patterns in adaptation to external 
demand and to the local features of climate, 
topography, and natural resources. Social 
differentiation may parallel this tendency 
to ecological distinctness until a number of 
clearly defined regional complexes evolve. 
Toward the end of this period, the nation, 
now liberated from colonial rule, will appear 
to be composed of a congeries of relatively 
autonomous regional economies and sociocul-
tural subsystems, each with its own adminis-
trative and commercial centers and tradition-
al channels of export.l5 
Perhaps the physical and climatic nature of the country 
is more decisive than any other element in the forming of 
spatial constraints to regional integration and the maintain-
ing of spatial differentiation between the regions of Libya 
in the past: 
The two more humid enclaves along the Libyan 
coast are effectively separated by the 
approach of Saharan conditions to the sea 
around the desolate shores of the Gulf of 
Sirte. This desert barrier, some 300 miles 
15F . dm rJ.e ann, op. cit., p. 9. 
(480 km) wide, has had a profoundly divisive 
effect throughout Libya's history. It has 
always been easier to travel from Tripoli-
tania to Tunisia and from Cyrenaica to Egypt 
than between the two Libyan provinces and 
they have indeed often owed separate political 
allegiance to their respective neighbors.l6 
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Friedmann sees disequilibrium as being built into tran-
sitional societies from the start. He uses the center-peri-
phery (spatial disequilibrium)_ model to describe the spatial 
structure of national economies that are in a state of tran-
sition to industrialization. In his opinion, "the automatic 
working of the market does not re-establish a spatial equili-
brium but reinforces the initial structural imbalance. Even 
where equilibrating tendencies persist, a balanced interre-
gional system may require several generations to come into 
existence." 17 By this statement, he supports Myrdal, who 
argues that the free functioning of the market mechanism 
causes most of the more productive forms of economic activity 
to group themselves in certain localities, thereby increasing 
the inequalities between regions. 18 
This has been the case in the recent history of the Libyan 
duai economy: 
16 
. . t 47 Harr1s, op. c1 ., p. • 
17Friedmann, op. cit., p. 99. 
18Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Nations (London: Duckworth, 1957), p. 26. 
Libya, in common with all the developing 
economies, possesses what can be called a 
dual economy. A modern market economy has 
been superimposed upon a traditional sub-
sistence economy. The former has its dis-
tinctive characteristics, differing in 
important respects from, say, its modern 
counterpart in India or from the highly 
developed British economy. However, in the 
way it works, the Libyan economy is e.fqenti-
ally similar to all market economies. 
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Both Myrdal and Friedmann agree that government intervention 
and control is essential for development to occur throughout 
the country. 
Hirschman's model of spatial polarization of economies 
also suggests a widening of the regional gap during the early 
stages of development. He, too, thinks that governmental 
intervention is effective in the development of the backward. 
areas within underdeveloped countries. 
Friedmann's contention is that regional convergence will 
not automatically occur in the course of a nation's develop-
mental history. This opinion is in contrast to the supporters 
of the equilibrium model. They argue that instead of a widen-
ing disparity in the rates of factor return and economic 
growth between center and periphery, a gradual convergence of 
19G. Heitmann, "Libya: An Analysis of the Oil Economy," 
The Journal of Modern African Studies VII, Vol. 2 (1969), 
pp. 250-251. 
20Albert o. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Develop-
ment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 194. 
21 these rates is the norm. 
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Friedmann cites several reasons for the failure of the 
world to correspond to the equilibrium theory: 
l) The failure of diminishing returns to set in at the 
center. 







The export demand for goods produced at the center. 
The coincidence of the center with the national market. 
The location of quaternary services at the center. 
The heterogeneity of the population. 
The inability of the periphery to make adjustments 
-appropriate to constant socioeconomic change at the 
center: 
a. High replacement rates on the periphery. 
b. Disruptive effects of rapid outmigration. 
c. Lack of capital. 
d. Inability and unwillingness to see the regional 
problem from a national perspective. 22 
4. The Breakdown of the Spatial 
Equilibrium Model in Libya 
In the following paragraphs, the nature of these influ-
21F . dm r~e ann, op. cit., p. 14. 
22Ibid., pp. 14-17. 
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ences, as they apply to the Libyan case, will be reviewed. 
4.a. Rural-Urban Migration 
Rural emigration, which is now occuring on a large scale 
in Libya, was regarded in the past as a temporary means of 
supplementing low and uncertain agricultural incomes. How-
ever, this migration becomes permanent frequently, resulting 
. . 1 b 1 . h . f . . 23 1n ser1ous a or asses 1n t e reg1ons o or1g1n. This 
drift from the land was happening even before the discovery 
of oil, but on a lesser scale. It had actually started dur-
ing the Italian colonization, "where much_land was confis-
cated for colonization, and when employment was available on 
24 
estates, in the Army, and in constructional works." Thus, 
23The following are some of the recent studies on aspects 
of social change and the effects of outmigration in Libya: 
Robert s. Harrison, "Migrants in the City of Tripoli, Libya," 
Geographical Review (July 1967): 397-423; R.G. Hartley, 
"Libya: Economic Development and Demographic Responses," 
in J.I. Clarke and W.B. Fisher (eds.), op. cit., pp. 315-347; 
Frederic c. Thomas, Jr., "The Libyan Oil Worker," Middle East 
Journal 15 (1961): 264-276, reprinted in I. William Zartman 
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 439-449; Ragaei El Mallakh, "The Eco-
nomics of Rapid Growth: Libya," Middle East Journal XXIII,. 
No. 3 (Summer, 1969): 308-320; John I. Clarke, "Oil in Libya: 
Some Implications," Economic Geography 39, No. 1 (January 
1963): 40-59; and J.D. Farrell, "Libya Strikes It Rich," and 
Robert Wylie Brown, "Libya's Rural Sector," Africa Report, 
April 1967, pp. 8-18. 
24 Clarke, op. cit., p. 55. 
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since the Italian colonization, urban jobs yielded larger 
incomes than agricultural jobs. Now the disparity has 
increased "the laborer can earn much more in Tripoli than on 
the land, and even the lowest-paid city worker often finds it 
possible to increase his income by holding several jobs at 
h t . ..25 t e same l.me. 
According to Hartley, 26 over 600,000 persons in Libya in 
1964, nearly 40 percent of the total population, had changed 
residence during their lifetime. This pattern of interregional 
migration is typical of the early stages of development. 
27 It supports the operation of both Myrdal's backwash effects 
and Hirschman's polarization effects: 
A most serious, and frequently observed, 
polarization effect consists in the kind of 
internal migration that may follow UDOll the 
economic advances of the North. Instead of 
absorbing the disguised unemployed, Northern 
progress may denude the South of its key 
technicians and managers as well as of the 
more enterprising young men.28 
The nomads' and semi-nomads' attitude toward paid labor 
has recently changed. Once considered undignified, labor for 
many is now regarded as a good means of personal improvement: 
25Harrison, op. cit., p. 404. 
26 Hartley, op. cit., p. 329. 
27 Myrdal,.op. cit., pp. 23-38. 
28Hirschman, op. cit., p. 188. 
A new awareness of being unemployed or 
unprofitably employed is begDh~ing to emerge. 
This is largely due to the attractive wages 
which are now being paid .... wage labor 
offers the poorer Libyan freedom from the 
uncertainties of agriculture and even a cer-
tain amount of.prestige.29 
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Although the main motive behind migration has usually 
been economic, urban attractions and modern city life has 
also been a stimulus. Migrants from the same region have 
settled in Tripoli or Benghazi, usually attracting additional 
migrants, and "the 'pull' is economic as well as social, 
since the longer-established migrants often arrange employ-
ment for the new-comers." 30 
Education, another city-oriented activity, has also been 
another reason for migration: "For higher technical or uni-
versity education students must migrate either to Tripoli or 
to Benghazi. Education encourages long·er absence from home, 
and a student leaving college finds that the best opportuni-
ties for employment are in the city." 31 
Thus, the selective nature of internal migration, which 
"tends to deprive the periphery of its youngest, most enter-
prising, and most educated population," 32 is occurring in 
29 Thomas., op. cit., p. 271. 
30Harrison, op. cit., p. 404. 
31 b.d 405 I ~ . ' p. • 
32p . dm •t 16 r~e ann, op. c~ ., p. • 
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Libya today. As we have seen from the above paragraphs, 
there has been a continuous movement of young men from the 
small towns to the big cities. More seriously, these people 
"comprise many of the educated minority who are attracted by 
the blandishments of the larger towns and by the opportuni-
33 ties of employment." Harrison also noticed this fact while 
travelling through the desert oases: "one is immediately 
impt-essed by the large proportion of their populations made up 
of old people and young children, and by the lack of younger 
men. n 34 
Friedmann thinks that the heavy outmigration from the 
small communities may deprive its people from adjustments 
that might otherwise lead to a recovery and to subsequent 
growth on a sustained basis. Nevertheless, some analysts 
who studied the migration problem in Libya think the opposite. 
For example, R.G. Hartley sees migration, despite its disrup-
tive effects, as a necessary element of the normal demographic 
and economic adjustments to a new equilibrium: 
33 
During the period of rapid urban growth, 
migration was the significant mechanism o:f 
demogra:phic change, and a stimulus to reactions 
in other demographic and economic conditions. 
Despite the disruptive forces and regional 
inequalities which it initially provoked, 
inter-.aal migration acted as an inst!"U!Uent of 
cultural diffusion and social integration. 
Clarke, op. cit., p. 55. 
34H . . 4 1 arr1son, op. c1t., p. 2 . 
As such, migration was a necessary element 
of normal demographic and economic adjust-
ment to a new equilibrium.35 
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Hartley also believes that this large outmigration par-
tially relieved the rural areas of an increasing population 
on a static resource base: "As such, external human pres-
sures permanently achieved what the environment had been 
f . th . d" 1 t" f t" n 36 orc1ng upon e 1n 1genous popu a 1on or some 1me. 
And yet, he seems to ignore the fact that the movement of 
the young men from small towns to the large cities is supple-
mented by the drift of landless laborers from rural areas. 37 
This fact, combined with a high natural rate of population 
increase, leads to high replacement rates on the periphery. 
The Government is trying, through its development plans and 
housing programs, to stabilize the rural population by improv-
ing opportunities for the people in the hinterland. But, 
as Farrell has put it, "a stroke of the ministerial pen could 
not check the movement of people attracted by the oil boom." 38 
35Hartley, op. cit., p. 329. 
36
rbid., p. 317. 
37 1 k . 5 Care, op. c1t., p. 5. 
38 Farrell, op. cit., p. 11. 
4.b. Urbanization and Economic 
Opportunities at the Center 
39 
Urbanization causes economic activity to concentrate in 
specific areas, thus creating regional disparities in devel-
opment and growth potential. The modern economy is situated 
in the urban industrial centers while the periphery remains 
less developed, reinforcing the disparities imposed by urban-
ization. The cities, with their booming construction indus-
tries and commerce, have been the main focus of commerical 
activity and the chief beneficiaries of the oil development. 
The economies of the villages and provincial towns have been 
threatened by the flight of capital and labor to Tripoli and 
Benghazi: 
Not only did the urban nuclei of Tripoli and 
Benghazi become the administrative centers of 
the oil industry, but more important, they 
became the receiving centers for the indirect 
benefits from oil revenues. As trade, trans~ 
port and service activities grew in conjunc-
tion with imports, it was inevitable that the 
towns would become the foci of the modern sec-
tor, being the major ports and domestic markets. 
With the difficulty of extending the agricul-
tural or habitable area, these trends continued 
to widen the gulf between the developing and 
stagnant sectors of the economy.39 
According to Clarke, in 1963 Tripoli alone contained two-
thirds of the country's industry, while another one-quarter 
was in Benghazi: "Without directed decentralization, future 
39Hartley, op. cit., pp. 318-319. 
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industrial development will inevitably be localized in the 
two main cities, as they are the principal markets. Indus-
trialization will merely reinforce the growing duopoly of 
urban functions." 40 Thus, a cumulative growth cycle has been 
set in motion at the center, in contrast to the expectation 
41 
of diminishing marginal returns to scale. 
Another feature of the present Libyan economic develop-
ment is the growth of tertiary and quaternary services (admin-
istration, commerce, finance, education, planning, etc.} 
at the center: "The two cities of Tripoli and Benghazi are 
far outstripping all other towns. They have taken turns as 
being federal capital, have accounted for over 90 percent of 
all maritime trade, and are the only two towns with modern 
urban amenities." 42 As Friedmann has put it: 
This array of service functions not only 
acts as a powerful attractive force on mod-
ern industry, but turns the center into the 
core of a permanent technological revolution. 
This tends to give centrally located enter-
prises an initial advantage over possible 
rivals on the periphery and serves further 
to concentrate capital at or near central 
locations.43 
40
clarke, op. cit., p. 58. 
41F . dm 't 14 15 r~e ann, op. c~ ., pp. - . 
42 Clarke, op. cit., p. 53. 
43 p ' drn 't 16 r~e ann, op. c~ ., p. • 
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4.c. Lack of capital at the Periphery 
Capital scarcity is the main factor leading to the obs-
erved wide disparities in the:-:spatial distribution of 
national income. As for the center, the opportunities for 
profitable investment have been abundant: "External econo-
mies and general benefits derived from agglomeration of capi-
tal projects in the relatively rich Northern regions may 
cause capital to emigrate from the South to the North, tend-
ing to accelerate interregional inequality and to widen the 
North-South schism." 44 
On the other hand, the ability of the periphery to absorb 
capital is low, that is, in terms of the available invest-
m_ent opportunities that yield a sufficient return to 
attract capital. In his analysis of the Libyan economy, 
Heitmann noted that: 
The dichotomy between the traditional and 
modern economies is of critical importance. 
As would be expected, capital is scarce in 
the traditional sector of the economy, whose 
absorptive capacity is low. The lack of an 
effectively integrated market mechanism--the 
absence of economic interdependence--can be 
said to imply this conclusion.45 
44J.G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process 
of National Development: A Description of the Patterns," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change XIII, No. 4, part 2 
(July 1965): 6. 
45 . t . 5 He1 mann, op. c1t., p. 2 3. 
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Little of the investment of wealthy Libyans is directed 
into peripheral industrial enterprises or the modernization 
of agriculture. Perhaps the "relative ease of making new 
investments at the center and their strong preference of 
enterprises for a metropolitan environment" 46 encourage 
them to devote their investments either to speculation in 
land buying or to the construction of residential buildings 
in Tripoli and Benghazi. 
The rapid growth in educational facilities in Libya will 
bring an increasing awareness of economic disparities between 
different parts of the country, "promoted by intensified infor-
mation flows through modern mass communications media and 
increased frequency of travel." 47 It is thus essential.,_econ-
omically and politically, for Libya "to decentralize economic 
growth and to effect a more widespread distribution of wealth 
. . •• Before migrants lose their ties with their homelands 
and become firmly rooted in the cities, regional productivity 
must be revitalized. Deployment of development funds and oil 
revenues is essential." 48 
In this respect, I quote a reply of an RCC member (Revo-
lutionary Command Council) in answering a question about the 
46Frl.'edmann, 't 15 op. cJ. . , p. . 
47 Stohr, op. cit., p. 1. 
48 Clarke, op. cit., p. 59. 
43 
aims of the revolution in the field of domestic policy: "To 
carry out a fair division of the resources of the country 
among the people and to work to destroy the disparities 
betw-een.rich and poor."49 
49
"The 'b 1 · · LJ. yan Revo ut1on 1n the Words of Its Leaders," 
Middle East Journal 24 (Spring 1970): 208. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OIL 
1. Introduction 
Until the discovery of oil, Libya had been in poor shape 
economically and dependent on outside aid. The resources of 
the country were not adequate to support the construction of 
those transport and communication links required to unify 
the country geographically or to create the educational and 
health facilities needed by the people. The basis for indus-
trialization was almost completely lacking and, in addition 
to that, the majority of the labor force was unskilled. In 
general, observers of the Libyan economy before the discovery 
of oil tended to describe it as "deficient." The balance of 
trade was in deficit. The federal, provincial, and municipal 
budgets were in deficit. In fact, the whole economy was oper-
ating at a deficit for decades. 
The discovery of oil in the country in the late 1950's, 
and the subsequent exploitation of this resource in huge quan-
tities, generated a sudden transformation. The aim of this 
chapter is to examine the development of the oil industry and 
its impact on the rest of the country. 
44 
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2. Growth of the Oil Economy 
2.a. Exploration and the Discovery of Oil 
Interest in Libya as a possible source of oil started 
after the. Second World War, when geologists reported thick 
sections of long-buried marine sediments in Libya. 1 It was 
not until 1955, after the discovery of oil in the Sahara Des-
ert (in Algeria to the west) provided the evidence that North 
Africa was an ·oil-bearing region, that Libya granted conces-
sions to international oil companies for exploration and 
drilling. Explorational activity started in 1956, following 
the enactment of the Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955. It was 
praised for its foresight: "The most important incentive to 
oil exploration in Libya, however, derived from the introduc-
tion of encouraging legal regulation by the government of 
Libya almost immediately after independence." 2 
The government stimulated competition by granting a large 
number of concessions and distributing them among many compa-
1Geologically, it is presumed that in prehistoric times 
Libya was submerged under the ancient Tethis Sea, and that 
marine deposits of alternating beds of sandstone and shale 
were left behind by the retreating sea, which later advanced 
again and left behind new marine and continental sediments--
all conditions for the accumulation of oil. 
2Rawle Farley, Planning for Development in Libya (New 
York: Praeger, 1971), p. 115. 
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nies. A further incentive to exploration was a provision of 
the Petroleum Law that required the periodic surrender of unex-
p•lored areas. Thus, the oil companies were under pressure 
to explore as much territory as possible before concessions 
expired: 
Perhaps the greater incentive for wide-scale 
development of Libyan oil was the section of 
the Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955 which 
required the periodic surrender of concession 
acreage. Thus the pressure was to explore 
all the territory allotted to ensure that 
none of the lapsed area would have gone unex-
amined. . Companies were required to com-
mence exploration within eight months of the 
grant of the concession and minimum amounts 
set for funds to be expended for that pur-
pose. These amounts increased with the lapse 
of time from the granting of the concession.3 
By 1958, 55 percent of the land area of the country was 
allocated to fourteen international oil companies (see Map 1) • 
According to the Petroleum Law, Libya did not surrender itself 
as a single concession to one company or a consortium of 
companies as did Saudi Arabia, which granted all of its oper-
ations to ARAMC0. 4 
3Ragaei E. Mallakh, "The Economies of Rapid Growth: 
Libya," Middle East Journal XXIII, No. 3 (Summer 1969): 310-
311; see also The Libyan Review (a monthly magazine published 
by the Department of Public Relations, Ministry of Information 
and Culture, Tripoli) XI, No. 4 (April 1967): 18-23. 
4According to El Mallakh, Ibid., p. 308, the number of 
foreign oil companies operating in Libya increased to 38 
involved in 136 concessions by 1969 "The breakdown on these 
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By 1959, oil had been discovered in commercial quanti-
ties,5 and two years later (October 1961) exportation began, 
marking the beginning of an important era in Liby~'s history. 
Since then, Libya has become a major oil-exporting country, 
experiencing great economic, social, and political transfer-
mations. 
2.b. Production, Construction of Pipelines and Oil 
Terminals, and ExportatJ..on of Crude Oil 
To bring the crude oil from the Zelten6 field to Marsa 
el Brega, the first oil shipment terminal on the most southerly 
curve of the Gulf of Sirte, 7 a 104-mile long, 30 inch 
British, Anglo-Dutch and Spanish. It should be recalled that 
nearly all the production in Africa and the Middle East, Ven-
ezuela and Indonesia is handled by eight major international 
companies. All of them participate in the Iranian Consortium, 
about 70 percent of Iraqi oil is produced by four of them, 
four are responsible for 100 percent of Saudi Arabian pro-
duction (including the Neutral Zone), and two majors in part-
nership control 90 percent of Kuwayti output." 
5For a detailed description of the exploring operations 
undertaken by individual companies,and the first oil discover-
ies, see the following sources: John Wright, Libya (New York: 
Praeger, 1969), Chapter 20, pp. 244-258; Rawle Fawley, op. 
cit., pp. 114-129; and John Clarke, "Oil in Libya: Some 
Implications," Economic Geography 39, No. 1 (January 1963): 
40-59. 
6
zelten was the first big find and the first to be 
exploited. 
7For a detailed story of the evolution of the sea terminal 
community of Marsa el Brega, see Kamal s. Sayegh, Oil and Arab 
Regional Development (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 122-126. 
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pipeline was constructed. In 1963, pipelines from the Zelten 
and Raguba fields delivered 165,000 barrels per day to tanker 
terminals at Marsa el Brega. Later additions to 
equipment increased the capacity to over 600,000 
pumping 
8 b.p.d. 
Marsa el Brega sprung up as a new oil town on the coast 
between Tripoli and Benghazi. 9 ~lis formerly small fish~g 
village has been turned into a sprawling terminal complex. 
It is also the site of a refinery and natural gas supplies, 
which have opened a potential field of development in petro-
chemicals and fertilizers. Between October 1961 and the 
spring of 1968, five major oil terminals were opened, giving 
an average rate of one opening every fifteen months. 10 
The second oil terminal, Es Sider, was opened in 1962 
and was followed later that year by the third terminal, Ras 
Lanuf. The former received oil via a 140-kilometer long, 
30-inch pipeline from Dahra, Gialo and other southern fields. 
The latter received the output of the Hofra, Beida, Kotla, 
and Amal oil fields. In 1965, the fourth terminal, Al Hariga, 
was opened near Tobruk. A 34-inch pipeline system running 
for 320 miles linked Serir field with this oil port, which 
8The Libyan Review, op. cit., No. 10 (October 1966): 20. 
9Marsa el Brega is 800 km. from Tripoli and 250 km. from 
Benghazi. 
10
wright, op. cit., p. 250. 
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is the only one outside the Sirtica system. The largest 
pipeline (40 inch) was completed in 1968 and was connected 
with zueitina, the fifth and last oil terminal on the Medi-
terranean, at a distance of about 100 miles south of Benghazi 
(see Map 2). 
The fast exploitation of the huge oil resources in Libya 
was remarkable. Production rose from less than a million tons 
in 1961 to 150 million in 1969, putting the country into 
third position among the petroleum-exporting countries in the 
world. 11 Also, in terms of reserves, Libya ranked third in 
world oil reserves in 1967, behind Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
(see Tables 1 and 2). Between 1961 and 1968, production 
increased over 145 times, exports by over 183 times, and 
12 
accumulated exports reached 401,490 thousand long tons. 
Even between consecutive years, production increases reached 
as much as 50 percent. For example, production increased 
from 684,055 thousand barrels, during 1967/68, to 1,012,436 
thousand, during 1968/69. This is approximately an increase 
of 48 percent. During the same period, exports also 
increased by 48 percent. ( Table 3). 13 The total production 
11Peter R. Odell, Oil and World Power: A Geographical 
Interpretation (London: Cox & Wyman, 1972), p. 82. 
12Bank of Libya, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Board 
of Directors, Financial Year 1968-1969, p. 150 
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Exploration, Production and Exports of the Libyan Oil: 1961-1969 
Companies Concession Productive No. of Production Exports 
Included areas in sq. Wells Drilling During During 
krns. {000) Rigs Period Period 
Produc- Unpro- {Thousand {Thousand 
tive ductive Long Tons) Long Tons) 
1 21 n.a. 173 36 875 677 
4 18 938.6 271 43 8, 763 8,403 
7 16 736.8 440 46 21,240 21,540 
10 15 727.3 657 45 41,340 40,490 
12 10 581.0 823 n.a. 58,656 57,373 
14 27 723.0 1,006 21 72,461 66,843 
16 27 622.0 1,086 22 83,667 81,783 
17 22 628.5 1,164 37 125,292 124,381 
17 22 n.a. 1,092 32 26,693 26,408 
17 22 n.a. 1,116 32 31,246 30,741 
17 22 n.a. 1,144 38 33,043 33,082 
17 22 628.5 1,164 37 34,310 34,150 
17 n.a. n.a. 1,197 43 34,741 34,189 
17 n.a. n.a. 1,173 37 11,578 10,830 
17 n.a. n.a. 1,189 43 10,941 11,629 
17 n.a. n.a. 1,197 43 12,222 11,730 
Source: Bank of Libya, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 

























World Oil Reserves, 1967 and 1969 
(in billions of barrels) 
Country Oil Reserves 
1967 1969 
Libya 29.2 35.0 
Saudi Arabia 74.7 140.0 
Kuwait 70.0 68.0 
Iraq 23.5 27.5 
Abu Dhabi 15.0 
Neutral Zone between Kuwait and saudi Arabia 13.5 
Algeria 6.9 8.0 
Qatar 3.75 
Muscat and Oman 2.5 
Syria 1.5 
U.A.R. 1.4 5.0 
Bahrain 0.195 
United States 38.7 
Venezuela 14.8 
World 414.3 
Source: 1967 figures, Oil and Gas Journal (December 25, 1967). 
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TABLE 3 
Distribution of Production and Exports According to Companies Operating in Libya 
Production (OOO;Barrels) Exports (000 Barrels) 
Company During During 1968/69 % During During 1968/69 
1967/68 Quantity I % to Total Change 67/68 Quantity I % to Total to 67/68 
Esso Libya 234,359 269,801 26.65 15.1 230,923 266,409 26.55 
oasis 232,318 248,652 24.56 7.0 231.314 248.122 24.73 
Occidental 6,449 188,131 18.58 2,817.2 4,459 185,544 18.49 
B.P./ N. Hunt 78,709 111,952 11.05 42.2 80,363 111,518 11.11 
Amoseas 52,320 104,175 10.29 99.1 51,631 101,501 10.11 
Mobil/Gels in-
berg 76,758 87,276 8.62 13.7 78,111 87,126 8.68 
Phillips 1,935 2,392 0.24 23.6 2,153 2,909 0.29 
Pan American 1,205 57 0.01 95.3 921 371 0.04 
TOTAL 684,053 1,012,436 100.00 48.0 679,875 1,003,500 100.00 
·----·--· -- --· 
Source: Bank of Libya, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 
Financial Year 1968-1969. 
% 
Change 
to 67/68 I 
15.4 ! 










of crude oil in 1969 was 1,154,452,000 barrels, and total 
exports amounted to 1,120,680,000 barrels, yielding a value 
of 772 million Libyan pounds, or about 2.2 billion dollars. 14 
The revenue accruing to the government of Libya from 
1962 to 1968 increased over 25 times, from 14.2 million Libyan 
4). 15 After 1962, oil pounds to 357.8 million (see Table 
began to dominate Libyan domestic exports. In 1963, 98.7 
percent of the total value of Libyan domestic exports came 
from crude oil (see Table 5). 16 
Europe has been the chief market for Libyan crude, 
where the major companies have their own refineries and mar-
keting facilities .. In 1966, Libya supplied more than 35 per-
cent of West Germany's imported crude, 18 percent of Britain's, 
and 8 percent of France's. During the fiscal year 1967/68, 
72.14 percent of Libya's oil exports went to the countries 
of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), and another 
12.98 percent went to the United Kingdom. West Germany alone 
accounted for nearly one quarter of the whole quantity exp-
orted during the same period, followed by Italy (22.02 
14Technical Planning Authority, Survey of the National 
Economy of the Libyan Arab Republic: 1964-1968, p. 81 
1963 
15Bank of Libya, op. cit., p. 155 
16Ministry 
(Tripoli: 
of National Economy, Statistical Abstracts 
Census and Statistical Department). 
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TABLE 4 
Revenue and Expenditure of Oil Companies, 1962-1968 
(In Millions L.P.) 
1962 1963 1964 1965•. . 1966 1967 1968 
Total Revenue 54.6 118.6 225.5 286.2 360.2 424.8 672.5 
l) Petroleum exports 47.0 116.9 216.4 280.3 353.4 415.7 664.3 
2) Re-exports 0.6 0.7 1.7 l.l 1.7 1.7 0.3 
3) Other Revenue 7.0 1.0 7.4 5.1 5.1 7.4 7.9 
Outlays 112.3 144.9 207.6 272.1 325.8 386.1 573.5 
Payments due to 
Libyan Government 14.2 38.5 75.2 125.4 186.7 223.3 357.8 
Source: Bank of Libya, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Board of 
Directors, Financial Year 1968-1969. 
TABLE 5 
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Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract 1963 
(Tripoli: Census and Statistical Department). 
TABLE 6 
Geographical Distribution of Petroleum Exports 
(Quantity in thousands of barrels) 
During 67/68 During 
Importing Countries Quantity % to Total Quantity 
1-E.E.C. 490,464 72.14 660,344 
A-west Germany 164,426 24.18 235,613 
B-Italy 149,700 22.02 207,997 
C-France 74' 164 10.90 105,087 
D-Holland 65,301 9.61 77,741 
E-Belgium 36,873 5.42 33,906 
2-United Kingdom 88,224 12.98 171,675 
3-Spain 33,624 4.95 62,064 
4-United States 16' 935 2.49 62,057 
5-Norway 7,767 1.14 9,601 
6-West Indies 7,445 11.10 9,486 
7-Denmark 12,513 1.84 8,973 
a-switzerland 4,969 0.73 8,804 
9-TUrkey 4,122 0.61 2,951 
10-Rumania 2,314 
11-Brazil 117 0.02 2,128 
12-Yugoslavia 3,845 0.57 1,456 
13-Ireland 1,039 0.15 570 
14-Sweden 1,899 0.28 482 
15-canary Islands 414 
16-U.A.R. 181 
17-Uruguay 1,388 0.20 
18-Canada 3,127 0.45 
19-0ther Countries 2,397 0.35 
Total 679,875 100.00 1,003,500 
Daily Average 1,858 2,749 
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Source: Bank of Libya, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Board of 
Directors, Financial Year 1968-1969. 
percent) 17 (see Table 6). 
Low transportation costs increased the importance of 
58 
Libyan oil to the economies of all the West European nations. 
Even with the Suez Canal open, Libya's favorable situation 
was obvious: the round journey from one of the Gulf of Sirte 
ports to the south European pipeline terminal near Marseilles 
is under 2,000 nautical miles; the comparable trip from the 
eastern Mediterranean terminals is 3,200 miles, and from 
Kuwait via t-he Canal. is 9,200 miles. 18 
2.c. Natural Gas 
19 A common by-product of many oil wells is natural gas. 
As Libyan crude oil production is accompanied by mass produc-
tion of natural gas, the quantity of the latter is wholly 
dependent on the output level of the fomer. In 1962, an esti-
mated one trillion cubic feet of natural gas was believed to 
be deposited under the ground at z elten, with a further five 
trillion cubic feet at other productive fields. The economic 
potential of this resource is of great importance. Exporting 
17Bank of Libya, op. cit., p. 153. 
18Area Handbook for Libya, prepared for the American 
University by Stanford Research Institute (December 1969): 204. 
19In Libya, oil and natural gas occur together, whereas 
in some areas, separate natural gas deposits have been found. 
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of natural gas through liquefication plants makes it an impor-
tant foreign-exchange earner. Through its utilization as a 
chemical raw material and fuel, natural gas offers an indus-
trial base for the domestic development of the country. 
In 1964, agreements were reached for the supply of 350 
million cubic feet per day to Italy and Spain. That year, 
at a cost of 300 million dollars, work started at Brega on 
construction of one of the largest 'gas-processing facilities' 
in the world. The plant, which was opened in January 1969, 
liquefies the natural gas piped from Zelten by cooling it to 
minus 260° Fahrenheit. It is then shipped aboard specially-
built refrigerator ships for delivery to Italian and Spanish 
. . . 1 20 
rece1v1ng term1na s. 
3. The Impact of Oil on the Libyan 
Economy and Planned Development 
In 1968, oil production increased to more than two mil-
lion barrels a day. Experts forecasted that in a few years 
time Libya would possibly become the biggest oil merchant. in 
the world. Daily exports reached three million barrels by 
1969, and Libya became the world's sixth largest oil producer 
and fourth largest oil exporter (see Table 7). 
The base of Libya's capital accumulation is oil. It 
cannot be compared with many other primary commodities, 
20




Crude Petroleum Production, 1962-1969: Monthly Averages or Calender Months 
(in thousands of metric tons) 
• 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
732 1,856 3,451 4,865 6,054 6,956 10,462 
Saudi Arabia 312 6,754 7,150 8,419 9,955 10,775 11,750 
Iran 5,484 6,130 7,051 7,844 8,787 10,730 11,713 
Iraq 4,097 4,722 5,136 5,373 5,663 5,018 6,148 
Kuwait 7,681 8,100 8,893 9,087 9,529 9,598 10,165 
Qatar 734 758 844 913 1,154 1,290 1,364 
Indonesia 1,899 1,856 1,910 2,000 1,937 2,109 2,477 
u.s. 30,138 31,000 31,384 32,079 34,097 36,225 37,490 
u.s.s.R 15,520 17,172 18,634 20,241 22,094 24,006 25,762 
Venezuela 13,929 14,139 14,852 15,201 14,701 15,457 15,767 













particularly agricultural ones, as it is a wasting asset. 
Few countries in the world have experienced such rapid eco-
nomic growth as Libya has in the past decade and one half. 
In 1959, its per capita income was estimated at less than 
$50; in 1966 the GNP per capita stood at $812 as against an 
average of $164 for all of Africa (excluding Egypt and the 
Republic of South Africa). By 1968, it reached $1,644, 21 
and by now it could be easily computed at well over 2,000 
due to the recent increases in crude oil prices in the 
22 
world. Resource exploitation will continue as the major 
contributor to the rate of growth of Libya's total gross 
national product and per capita GNP which "stood at 14.6 per-
cent and 10.6 percent respectively--the highest averages not 
only for developing countries but for all countries." 23 
(see Tables 8 and 9) 
With its capital based upon the depletion of an asset, 
21 Farley, op. cit., p. 256. 
22For a comprehensive study of the developments in the 
politics of international crude oil prices, and particularly 
the pricing of the Libyan crude and the role of the Libyan 
revolutionaries in this respect, see Taki Rifai, !h~-~E~sin~ 
of Crude Oil: Economic and Strategic Guidelines for an Inter-
n&::f1:9Jl§:X:~ii~£~i=~~?:fEi-New-York:--Praeger;-rnn;-especi=-
ally the following sect1ons: "The Pricing of Libyan Crude 
Oils," pp. 89-99, "1970: The Libyan Year," and "Assessment 
and consequences of the Libyan Settlement," pp. 249-262, and 
"The Tripoli Agreement," pp. 270-276. 
23 Farley, op. cit., p. 256. 










Estimated Average Annual Growth Rates, 
Selected Countries, 1964-1967 
Percent Change in GNP 
Percent Change in Total Per Capita from 
GNP Preceeding Year 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1964 1965 1966 1967 
15.4 34.6 16.6 12.6 11.4 29.8 12.5 8.6 
6.0 4.0 3.2 2.7 4.9 3.0 2.4 2.0 
5.5 6.3 6.4 2.4 4.0 4.9 5.1 1.3 
9.1 5.1 2.8 5.0 5.4 1.5 -0.7 1.4 
10.3 8.1 0.4 1.3 5.9 4.4 -2.1 -0.3 
14.4 3.7 10.7 13.7 13.2 2.5 9.7 12.5 
6.9 7.1 2.9 5.7 6.3 5.7 1.6 4.6 










































GNP Growth Rates of Developing 
Countries, 1960-1967 
1960-1967 Annual Per Capita 1960-67 




























Dominican Republic 2.9 -0.7 
Senegal 3.6 1.2 
Ivory Coast 7.5 5.3 
Jordan 8.8 6.1 
Equador 4.5 l.l 
'1\lnisia 3.8 1.5 
Egypt 4.7 2.1 
Morocco 3.2 0.3 
Ceylon 3.8 1.3 
Kenya 3.2 0.3 
Nigeria 4.0 1.6 
Pakistan 5.7 3.1 
Sudan 4.1 1.2 
India 4.1 1.5 
Tanzania 3.7 1.2 
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Libya must make its capital as productive as possible to 
compensate for and replace the non-renewable resources. W. 
Arthur Lewis has pointed out that, although development is 
limited by the extent of a country's resources, other non-
economic factors are of equal importance: 
For most countries could make better use 
of their existing resources than they do. 
Given the country's resources, its rate of 
growth is determined by human behaviour 
and human institutions: by such things as 
energy of mind, the attitude towards mater-
ial things, willingness to save and invest 
productively, or the freedom and flexibility 
of institutions. Natural resources determine 
the course of development, and constitute 
the challenge which may or may not be accepted 
by the human mind.24 
The oil industry contributed to the gross national 
product, foreign exchange, government budgets, capital for-
mation, employment and training of labor, and the supply of 
fuel and raw materials to the local economy. In addition: 
the oil industry also makes an indirect con-
tribution and exercies a certain 'multiplier 
effect' through its local purchases of goods 
and services. This often makes it possible 
for other industries and services to develop 
and benefit from economies of scale and exter-
nal economies because of increased demand for 
local products either by the oil industry or 
by the recipients of the income generated by 
the oil industry. Other indirecL contributions, 
such as the supply of oil for local consumption 
at prices below those prevailing in world 
markets, the provision of various forms of 
24Lewis, W. Arthur, The Theory of Economic Growth, 
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1955, p. 52. 
assistence to gove~ents, and the 
developing of labor skills and entre- ? 5 preneurial talents, should also be noted.-
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The sectoral structure of the Libyan economy exhibits 
conditions of imbalance in its most severe form. While oil 
has been developed extensively, other sectors remained com-
paratively underdeveloped. 
Agriculture 
Before the discovery of oil, nearly 80 percent of the 
population lived in the rural and nomadic sectors of the 
economy. Most of the labor force was engaged in agriculture, 
which was at the subsistence level, except for some occasion-
ally marketable surpluses in cereals and livestock. 26 
The traditional agricultural problem has been caused 
primarily by physical and climatic constraints. The land is 
arable only in a few regions that lack an adequate supply of 
water. Everywhere rainfall is both inadequate and unreliable 
and the interior of the country has virtually no rainfall. 
Scattered oases have underground water near the surface. The 
average annual rainfall exceeds 20 inches in only one small 
area of the Jebel Akhdar (Grean Mountains) of Cyrenaica, 
and even there it is concentrated in a five-month season. 27 
25
rssawi, Charles, and Yeganeh, Mohammed, The Economics 
of Middle Eastern Oil, New York: Praeger, 1962, p. 142. 
2 6Allan, J. A. , et. al. , Libya: Agriculture and Economic 
Development, London: Frank Cass & Sons, 1973, p. 9. 
27 Brown, R.W., "Libya's Rural Sector," Africa Report, 
April 1967, p. 16. 
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In addition to the scarcity of rainfall, the soil is 
poor in most areas. Only the Jebel Akhdar and the coastal 
belt, west of Tripoli and the central Jefara enjoy better 
soils. (see Maps 3 and 4) In 1959, the World Bank Mission 
to Libya described agriculture development as presenting a 
number of challenging problems: 
Given the sparsity and irregularity of rain-
fall and the impoverishment of the soil 
through many centuries of neglect, large 
investments are needed in measures of soil 
and water conservation simply to preserve 
the existing assets and to prevent a further 
deterioration in farming conditions.28 
About 17.3 percent of the money allocated for the First 
Five-Year Plan, 1963-1968, was devoted to the development of 
agriculture. This was spent on agriculture settlement, 
agriculture marketing, the development of water resources and 
soil conservation, agriculture machinery, etc. (see Table 
10) Despite the size of the allocation for agriculture, exter-
nal observers noted that agriculture could absorb the 
funds reserved for the whole Plan (169 million Libyan pounds), 
without showing much immediate return. 29 In addition to the 
many physical constraints facing agricultural development, 
there were other inhibiting factors, such as land ownership, 
defects in marketing and transportation facilities, educational 
-· 
28 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) ,_ Economic Development of Libya, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1960; p. 18. 
29The Economist, (London, June 12, 1965), p. 1323. 
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First Five-Year Plan 1963-1968 
Summary Program for Agriculture 
Project 
l. Agriculture settlement 
2. Agriculture marketing 
3. Development of water resources and soil 
conservation 
4. Heavy and light agricultural machinery 
5. Forest and range development 
6. Animal health development 
7. Agricultural extension 
8. Horticulture 
9. Plant disease and pest control 
10. Agricultural research and experiments 
11. Agriculture statistics 
12. Agriculture credit 
69 
Estimated Cost 















Source: Ministry of Planning and Development, Five-Year Economic 
and social Development Plan, 1963-1968 (Tripoli, Ministry 
of Planning and Development), p. 77. 
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backwardness among farmers, shortcomings in credit facili-
ties, and inadequate organization of agriculture. 30 
After the discovery of oil, a serious manpower shortage 
was added to the existing farming problems. This arose from 
the migration of the rural population to the cities, oil 
fields, and construction sites in search of higher wages. 31. 
As a result of the rural-urban migration, farms and oasis-
gardens were neglected, the number of livestock diminished, 
and the land reclaimed from the desert was again threatened 
by sand. Unless the rural population can be encouraged to 
remain in the countryside, Libya could become a country 
dependent on a single diminishing resource. Rowe-v-er, this. can 
only be achieved when "profits from farming are competitive 
with other forms of employment. 32 
Industry 
The state of the industrial sector (excluding oil) did 
not differ very much from the backward state of the agricul-
tural sector. Industry had its share of constraints that had 
limited its development since the beginning of Libya's 
3
°For a detailed discussion of these problems, see the 
(IBRD) Report, op. cit., pp. 130-142. 
31
see Chapter II of this thesis for a discussion of the 
effects of rural-urban migration. 
32 Brown, R.W., op. cit., p. 18. 
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independence. Libya's domestic market was small because 
of its limited population and its uneven distribution among 
the main settled regions, separated from each other by large 
uninhabited areas. 
The World Bank Mission to Libya, in 1959, noted that 
"Social and economic differences between the nomadic, the 
settled rural and the urban populations and the considerable 
differences in their purchasing power and patterns of con-
sumption have further split up the market, restricting the 
scope for large industrial units and narrowing down the range 
of products for which local manufacturer is economic." 33 
Power and fuel resources were limited and raw materials were 
confined to a few and irregularly supplied agricultural 
resouxces. There were a few mineral resources that could be 
developed, such as natron deposits in Fezzan and deposits 
of potash in the Sirte Desert near Marada. Transportation 
facilities were inadequate, and local management, capital, 
entrepreneurship, and skilled labor remained largely in short 
supply. 34 
The future of industry in Libya will be influenced by 
devleopments in both the oil and the agricultural sectors. 
Local oil and natural gas production will provide a cheaper 
source of fuel for industry as a whole as well as a potential 
33 (IBRD), 't 180 op. c~ . , p. . 
34 Farley, Rawle, op. cit., p. 139. 
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source of raw materials for the manufacture of chemicals and 
fertilizers. The expansion of agricultural sector is needed 
to supply raw materials for the processing industries, and 
because increased farm income will provide a larger market 
for manufactured goods. 35 
Communications 
Communications were in a state of backwardness at the 
end of the second World War. The communication complex had 
suffered great damage, as well as many years of neglect. 
The first Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan 
recognized that communications were vital to the development 
of agriculture, industry, and commerce. The Communication 
secto-r, therefore, received almost the same share as the 
agriculture sector from the allocations of this Plan (over 
27 million pounds). This was spent on roads, telecommunica-
tions, ports and lights, civil aviation, and meteorology.36 
The size of the country and the scattered nature of the popu-
lation were the main difficulties traditionally confronting 
Libya in the field of communications. 
c. The Evolution of Libyan 
Development Planning 
The evolution of modern economic planning in 
35 (IBRD), op. cit., p. 182. 
36M· . t f 1 . d 1 . . inis ry o P anning an Deve opment, Five-Year Economic 
and Social Development Plan: 1963-68, Tripoli. 
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Libya37 can be traced back only as far as the years of the 
Italian occupation, since the country was continuously poor 
during its previous history. Some planning did emerge under 
the Italian administration, for public works, utilities and 
agricultural development, but the extent and direction of 
these developments were made for the benefit of the 
. f h "b 38 Italians alone and at the expense o t e L~ yans. 
The post-independence period of economic growth was 
clearly desperate. It depended primarily on external aid 
that was "vital for the containment of further economic 
decline." 39 Thus, with the help of the United Nations, all 
the resources necessary for the development of Libya, during 
its early years of independence, had to come from abroad. 40 
For example, the six-year plan of 1952-58 was made possible 
by foreign aid granted to and administered by the Libyan 
government. 41 Until the discovery of oil, therefore, the 
37For a detailed discussion of the evolution of economic 
planning in Libya from the pre-independence period to the 
initiation of Libya's first five-year planning program, see 
Rawle Farley, Planning for Development in Libya, New York, 
Praeger, 1971, pp. 161-203. 
38International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Economic Development of Libya, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1960, p. 27. 
39 1 1 . 163 Far ey, Raw e, op. c~t., p. . 
40According to Higgins, Libya "has become a pilot plant 
for a large-scale program of technical and capital assistance 
in which the UN, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
and Italy are all participating," Benjamin Higgins, Economic 
Development, Principles, Problems, and Policies, New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1959, p. 37. 
41Ibid., (1968 edition) p. 821. 
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Libyan economy clearly survived through foreign aid. Since 
the early 1960's, oil revenues have relieved Libya of finan-
cial dependence on foreign governments and enabled the 
country to finance developmental planning. Libya introduced 
its First Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan for 
the years 1963-1968. The plan called for an expenditure of 
about 170 million Libyan pounds for the same period. 42 
The Aims of the first five-year plan were: 
(1) To ensure the rapid improvement of the 
standards of living of the people, partie-
ularly those of limited income who did not 
benefit from the economic prospertity. 
(2) To give special consideration to the 
agricultural sector, being the source of 
supply of most of the essential consumer 
goods, besides being the source of income 
and employment for the majority of the 
people; to pay attention to industry; to 
improve the productive efficiency of farmer 
and laborer; and to encourage the private 
sector to make investments in these fields. 
(3) To permit the public sector to continue 
its investments in such services as educa-
tion, health, communications and housing, 
42Ministry of Planning and Development, Five-Year 
Economic and Social Development Plan 1963-1968, (Tripoli: 
Ministry of Planning and Development). 
together with the other sectors 
required to consolidate the basic 
elements needed for a rapid economic 
growth. 
(4) To develop rural areas by establishing 
all the productive and public service 
projects, thus ensuring reqular employ-
ment for countrymen' and utilizing their 
productive faculties and raising their 
incomes in such a way, as to achieve 
justice in the distribution of national 
income and restriction of their migra-
tion into the cities. 
(5) To organize the imports policy so as to 
avoid importation of all goods that can 
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be produced in the country on the one hand, 
and to ensure protection from the danger 
of inflation and the provision of suffi-
cient supplies of the capital goods needed 
for development on the other; at the same 
time to strive to step up local production 
and to adopt an appropriate customs policy 
for its protection, in this way gradually 
and continuously substituting locally 
p~oduced goods for imports. 
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(6) To take such monetary, financial, and 
commercial measures -- all in a coer-
dinated effort -- as may be necessary 
to ensure increased revenue, and to enforce 
tight-belt control on expenditures. 
(7) To take steps to meet the lack of infer-
mation and statistical data that are 
necessary for planning, by strengthening 
the existing statistical organs as well 
as by studies and research work. 43 
The tremendous development in the oil sector and the 
accumulation of oil revenues enabled the country to allocate 
LD. 1156 million (about 4 billion dollars) for the Three-
Year Development Plan 1972-1974. 44 The Plan has had a far-
reaching effect in activating the national economy and its 
various sectors. It was devised to bring about a change in 
development strategy: 
It aims to restrict production of crude oil 
to the limit technically and economically 
required, and directing a large part of oil 
revenues to productive sectors, mainly agri-
culture and industry so as to achieve 
43Ministry of Planning and Development, op. cit., pp. 50-
51, see also Rawle Farley, op. cit., pp. 198-200. 
44
central Bank of Libya, Economic Bulletin, Published 
by the Economic Research Division of the Central Bank of Libya, 
September-December 1972. 
equilibrium and diversification sources of 
income in the national economy, and lessen 
the semi-total dependence on the oil sector. 
The plan aims at raising real total produc-
tion of the non-oil economic activities by 
35.6 percent.45 
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A look at the distribution of the gross domestic pro-
duct from table 11 shows that petroleum mining accounted for 
62.1 percent in 1969. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
contributed 3.1 percent. The imbalance is apparent in the 
fact that the contribution of manufacturing combined with 
agriculture accounted for only 4.8 percent of the GDP. 46 
From the distribution of the population by economic sectors 
in 1964, we find that agriculture represented the largest 
single sector, with 145,000 persons employed, followed by 
services that employed 84,900 people. Construction absorbed 
the third largest number of workers. According to 1968 esti-
ma~es , 51,400 workers or about 11.7 percent of the total 
labor force were employed in construction. Estimates of 
the same year showed a decline in the percentage engaged in 
agriculture, from 39.8 in 1964 to 32.5 in 1968. Manufactur-
ing ranked fourth, followed by commerce and transport (see 
Table 12). 
Thus, while the oil industry (included under mining and 
quarrying in Table 12) is the leading sector in contribution 
to the gross domestic product, and is responsible for most of 
45 b"d 130 I 1 ., p. . 
46Technical Planning Authority, National Accounts of the 
Libyan Arab Republic: 1962-1969. 
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TABLE 11 
Gross Domestic Product and National Income of Libya 
(in millions of Libyan Pounds) 
Industrial Classification 1962 % 1969 % 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 14.9 9.6 37.4 3.1 
Petroleum mining 38.0 24.4 754.7 62.1 
Other mining and quarrying 0.6 0.4 1.4 0.1 
Manufacturing 9.0 5.8 20.8 1.7 
Construction 10.3 6.6 86.6 7.1 
Electricity and gas 0.9 0.6 4.0 0.3 
Transportation and communication 8.6 5.5 40.2 3.3 
Wholesale and retail trade 14.2 9.1 48.5 4.0 
Banking and insurance 1.7 1.1 7.9 0.6 
Public Administration & defense 15.5 10.0 86.8 7.1 
Educational services 5.0 3.2 32.3 2.7 
Health services 2.1 1.4 13.2 1.1 
~;nership of dwelling 29.4 18.9 70.2 5.8 
Other services 5.3 3.4 11.8 1.0 
GOP at factor cost 115.5 100.0 1215.8 100.0 
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TABLE 12 
Persons Gainfully Occupied 1964 and 1968 
1964 1968 
Adjusted Census Estimates 
Industry Number Percent Number Percent 
Agriculture, etc. 145,400 39.8 143,000 32.5 
Mining & Quarrying 14,800 4.1 18,800 4.3 
Manufacturing 30,200 8.3 37,200 8.4 
Construction 32,400 8.9 51,400 11.7 
Electricity, water 6,300 1.7 7,800 1.8 
Commerce 27,800 7.6 32,400 7.4 
Transport, cornrnunic. 23,500 6.4 36,500 8.3 
Services 84,900 23.2 112,800 25.6 
Total 365,300 100.0 439,900 100.0 
Source: Technical Planning Authority, Survey of the National 
Economy of the Libyan Arab Republic, 1964-1968. 
government revenues and export earnings, it is the least 
important sector in employment, absorbing less than two 
percent of the total labor force; 
While the discovery and production of oil in 
Libya has served to quicken the drift of labor 
from the rural areas to the cities, the petro-
leum industry itself can absorb directly only 
a small portion, as it is capital-intensive. 
The number of employment opportunities is 
limited, with the highest labor requirements 
exercised during the primary stage of explora-
tion. The industry and its contractors will 
be unable to provide work for more than five 
percent of the labor force in the foreseeable 
future, even allowing for the establishment of 
oil-based industries. In 1966, less than two 
percent of the labor force was directly 
employed in the oil industry.47 
Rostow (1962) has examined the relationship between 
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economic growth in general, and economic growth in the par-
ticular sectors of an economy. Looking from a historical 
perspective at the growth patterns of different economies, 
he arrived at two facts: 
1. Growth rates in the various sectors of the 
economy differ widely over any given period of 
time; 2. In some meaningful sense, over-all 
growth appears to be based, at certain periods, 
on the direct and indirect consequence of 
extremely rapid ~~ovnh in certain particular key 
sectors.48 
47El Mallakh, R . •t 314 _agae1, op. c1 ., p. . 
48 Rostow, w.w., The Process of Economic Growth, New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1962, pp. 261-62. 
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Rostow cited several examples of the classic sequence 
of leading sectors. The cotton industry sustained overall 
British growth from 1780 to 1840, and later, steel, chemical, 
electrical, and light-engineering products all performed 
the role of the leading sector. The position of the rail-
roads in the United States "were the instrument for launching 
the American industrial evolution, yielding as it did a 
modern centralized iron industry, and •.• steel industry." 49 
Rostow stated that the role of .leading sectors in carrying 
forward such sequences is not confined to the major industrial 
economies. It also is observed in the more specialized econ-
omies that depend on exports: 
They may be based on the effective exploitation 
of natural resources·, in relation to the require-
ments,._ of the world market, as well as on 
a succession of breakthroughs in the appli-
cation of science to economic purposes.SO 
Perhaps for Libya, the sectoral leadership of oil is 
without precedent in any other economy - with the exception 
of some Middle Eastern oil-producing nations. The oil 
sector's dominance over the res·t of the economy is even more 
striking given the country's traditional agricultural base. 
The situation in Libya resembles, with some exceptions, the 
case of Kuwait. Ragaei El Mallakh, in a study of the economic 
development of Kuwait, observed that there are three 
49 Rostow, W.W., op. cit., p. 262. 
50
rbid., p. 263. 
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conditions necessary for improving the sectoral imbalance; 
First, that the country has at its disposal the technological 
innovations evolved by the major advanced countries through 
their development; Second, that the capital surplus could 
facilitate the application of these technological advances 
by obtaining the equipment and services necessary; Third, 
that the oil sector encompasses more than the "primary" 
element of supply, yielding a growth rate that could be 
higher than that of other sectors, through innovation and 
advances in.techJlology: 
In short, if a country is to have its economic 
growth advanced by a pronounced sectoral 
imbalance, then oil is one of the strategic sec-
tors for leadership because additional units 
of investment will give the maximum increase 
in output. Theoretically, concentration on 
a leading sector may well drag along other 
sectors as increases in real income occur. 
This might lead to the ultimate development 
of the slmver growing sectors. The Kuwaiti 
experience illustrates this tr'end. 51 
4. Problems of Balanced Growth 
4.a. An Introductory Note 
Balanced growth means the achievement of a state of 
equilibrium in growth by spreading its benefits throughout 




El Mallakh, Economic Development and Regional 
Kuwait (Chicago: The Universlty of Chicago 
p. 19. 
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unbalanced growth strategies concentrates on the relationship 
between the different sectors of the economy as well as on 
"the major social problems that might arise from undertaking 
them and the political regime and administrative systems they 
52 presuppose." 
4.b. Balanced Growth Theory 
Proponents of a balanced growth theory emphasize the 
need to keep the different sectors of a developing economy 
in step in order to avoid supply and demand difficulties. 
To make development possible, therefore, it is necessary to 
advance on many domestic fronts at once. Nurkse considered 
the narrowness of the market and the lack of demand and pro-
ductivity as obstacles to growth in the developing areas: 
"The difficulty ..• is due above all to the inevitable 
52
warren F. Ilchman and Ravindra C. Bhargave, "Balanced 
Thought and Economic Growth," in Charles K. Wilber (ed.}, 
The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment 
(New York: Random House, 1973}, p. 26. (The authors made 
certain assumptions about the social system and its response 
to economic change: "First, the population is increasingly 
'mobilized,' i.e., a population shifting to wages and a more 
complex division of labor, exposed to mass media and increas-
ing education, and more easily susceptible to new forms of 
organization. Second, extreme inequalities of income, infla-
tion over a long period of time without redistribution, 
and accelerated urbanization without adequate social overhead 
expenditures and provision for the maintenance of primary 
group relationships or acceptable alternatives are destabi-
lizing to a social system." Ibid., note 3, p. 42. 
84 
inelasticity of demands at low real-income levels. It is in 
this way that lack of buying power cramps the inducement to 
invest in any individual industry." 53 In order to stimulate 
investment, Nurkse argued, it is necessary to expand the size 
of the market: 
The difficulty is not present, however, in the 
case of a more or less synchronized application 
of capital to a wide range of different indus-
tries. Here the result is an overall enlarge-
ment of the market and hence an escape from 
the deadlock. People working with more and 
better tools in a number of complementary 
projects become each other's customers •. 
This basic complementarity stems, of course, 
from the diversity of human wants."54. 
4.c. Unbalanced Growth Theory 
In contrast to the balanced growth thesis, Hirschman 
argues for "unbalanced growth" as a starting point in mobil-
izing latent resources. In his opinion, "growth is neces-
sarily unbalanced .. In analyzing the process of unbal-
anced growth, we could always show that an advance at one 
point sets up pressures, tensions, and compulsions toward 
growth at subsequent points." 55 Hirschman strongly disagrees 
53 Ragnar Nurkse, "Some International Aspects of the Prob-
lem of Economic Development," in A.N. Agarwala and s.P. Singh 
(eds.), The Economics of Underdevelopment (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1958), p. 257. 
54 Idem. 
55Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Develop-
ment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 184. 
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with the "balanced growth" doctrine and criticized it especi-
ally from its demand and supply sides: 
My principal point is that the theory fails 
as a theory of development. Development pre-
sumably means the process of change of one 
type of economy into some other more advanced 
type. But such a process is given up as hope-
less by the balanced growth theory which finds 
it difficult to visualize how the 'underdevel-
opment equilibrium' can be broken into at any 
one point."5 6 
Hirschman believes that the exponents of balanced growth 
failed to recognize that developing countries lack the neces-
sary resources to start their development in a balanced way; 
"How many a Western traveler to an underdeveloped country has 
been bewildered and dismayed by the ubiquitous poverty and 
inefficiency, by the immensity of the task, and by the inter-
locking vicious circles:" 57 Thus, Hirschman favors disequil-
ibrium, and his model is devoted to the task of devising a 
policy for sustaining a process of economic transformation. 
over time, he argues, imbalances will tend to be restored 
through a variety of market and non-market forces: "It is 
our contention that nonmarket are not necessarily less 'auto-
matic' than market forces." 58 
Commenting on Hirschman's ideas of "controlled imbalance," 
56Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
57 Ibid., p. 52. 
58Ibid., p. 63. 
Friedmann adds: 
Hirschman is fully aware that the economic 
system must not stray too far from the main 
path; where the gap in economic development 
between center and periphery is gaining, he 
favors a policy that will reverse the trend 
to regional divergency by establishing, 
within the periphery, new core regions and 
consequently a new set of spatial imbalances. 
Implied is the progressive extension of a 
system of cities into the periphery as the 
optimum path of national development."59 
4.d. Libya's Prospects for Adopting 
an Economic Strategy for Growth 
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The problem is what type of economic strategy--balanced 
versus unbalanced--should an economy, such as Libya's,adopt 
in order to achieve the efficient use and optimum allocation 
of its resources? This is not an easy question and statesmen 
and policy makers should answer other questions before 
attempting to select an economic strategy for their countries. 
Some of these are questions asked by Friedmann: 
Which set (of regions) is to be balanced? 
What should be balanced? Is it total invest-
meiJ.t in th"' aggregate or in each sector? _ 
Is it investment divided by population, fami-
lies, or unit area? Is a balance to be 
achieved by having all regions grow at equal 
rates? Or should poor regions grow at a faster 
rate to allow them to catch up with regions 
that are better off? Is balance expressed in 
average income per family so that eventually 
all regions will be approximately equal in 
this respect? How is the policy maker to know 
59John Friedmann, Regional Development Policy: A Case 
Study of Venezuela (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), 
p. 50. 
when he is perched on the narrow edge of 
optimal imbalance or has exceeded it? When 
does 'optimal imbalance' become just plain 
inefficiency?60 
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Adoption of either one of the two major economic strate-
gies for growth depends on the type of regime that will imple-
ment it, since "each alternative has different policy impli-
cations and different consequences for economic growth." 61 
For example, the "big push" balanced growth strategy "can 
only be adopted by a regime that has a considerable amount 
of resources and control over both public and private enter-
prise. This regime must have central planning and a means of 
persuasion, inducement, or coercion to secure compliance." 62 
This authoritarian regime, says Ilchman and Uphoff, must also 
have the support of the intellectual, bureaucratic, and mili-
tary elites, as well as the support of the business sector. 
On the other hand, a regime that is about to select imbalanced 
growth strategy would be "sympathetic to the interests and 
activities of private entrepreneurs, or presumably to those 
of foreign investors. For this reason, it cannot be taken 
seriously by socialistically-inclined regimes or by regimes 
60




warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, The Politi-
cal Economy of Change (Berkeley, Cal.: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1969), p. 12. 
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in countries where private business has low status."63 
4.d.l. Balanced Growth in a Capital-Surplus Economy 
Viewing the balanced-growth theory in terms of Libya's 
capital-surplus economy, Higgins notes that: 
Nurkse's advice for cases which fit his 
assumptions. ••• is cold comfort for countries 
like Libya and the other Middle East oil coun-
tries, where the domestic market is too small 
for the most efficient capital-intensive 
techniques to be profitably used over a large 
number of industrial activities ..•• Libya 
has both a strong export and a virtually 
unlimited supply of capital, but cannot really 
rr develop u for lack of human resources. 64 
The balanced growth theory stresses the need for the expansion 
of economic and social infrastructure, such as health, educa-
tion, transport, and housing. This emphasis on economic and 
social infrastructure is, perhaps, even more important and 
vital to the problems of developing countries. 
Fortunately, Libya is not faced with the problem of capi-
tal shortage, as is the case with many developing countries, 
and, therefore, building a social overhead capital is feas-
ible: 
Planning under a capital-surplus economy can 
potentially implement the balanced-growth 
theory. Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia 
because of their extraordinary affluence can 
63
rbid., p. 13. 
64Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development: Principles, 
Problems, and Policies (N7e~w~Y~o~r~k~:-=~w~.~WT.~N~o~r~t~o~n~,~l~9~678~)~,~p~p~. 
818 and 838. 
capitalize every sector of the economy. 
Public capitalization simply takes the 
place of private capitalization that is 
not forthcoming for the obvious reason 
that the basic conditions to attract pri-
vate capital are absent.65 
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Farley, also, sees the personnel problem as a real constric-
tor to the immediate implementation of the balanced-growth 
thesis: "The great limitation to the big-push-balanced-
growth theory, as revealed by Libyan circumstances, lay in 
the quantitative and qualitative shortage of the type of 
labor required to cooperate with the readily available sur-
plus capital. n 66 
Libya, by virtue of its wealth and in the national . 
interest, must direct more attention teo the investment ·in t.lle 
many settlements throughout the country in order to reduce 
the disparities between them and the traditional urban 
regions. In addition, as part of its social resposibility, 
Libya should improve its standard of living and make life 
better in its widely dispersed, and long depressed, oases and 
settlements. This will have both stabilizing and positive 
economic and social effects in the country: 
. if rural migration were to be stemmed, 
the oases had to be developed. If national 
unity were to be cemented, the oases had to 
be developed. If modernizing influence were 
65Farley, op. cit., p. 252. 
66 b'd 255 I ]. . I P· . 
to be spread beyond the coast, new investment 
had to be pumped into the oases. In any 
case, . . • the country had the financial 
capacity to deploy surplus capital oasis 
by oasis and region by region."67 
4.d.2. Unbalanced Growth in a Capital-Surplus Economy 
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Turning now to the doctrine of Hirschman's unbalanced 
growth, we see that certain premises apply to the Libyan 
case, while others are unapplicable. For example, the Libyan 
situation supports Hirschman's position that "the ability to 
invest" in developing countries is weak in contrast to the 
actual availability of savings, and, "development is held 
back primarily by the difficulties of channeling existing or 
potentially existing savings into available productive invest-
ment opportunities."68 In the developing countries' 
economy, according to Hirschman, total savings exceed total 
investment capacity, whether or not the distribution of 
income is.,<.meven. This excess may appear in hoarded gold or 
foreign exchange, or "may be indicated by luxury consumption 
of the rich, by occasional large-scale spending and gifts 
even among the poor, and by considerable amounts of time 
devoted to leisure and similar phenomena ubiquitous in under-
developed countries." 69 
67 b"d 253 I J. • I p. . 
68Hirschman, op. cit., p. 36. 
69 b"d 37 I J. • I p. . 
Heitman, who also thinks that it is more fashionable to 
view the developing economy in terms of its availability to 
absorb capital, looks at the Libyan situation from the con-
text of the dichotomy between the traditional and the modern 
economies. He attributes the failure of the former to 
attract: capital and absorb it effectively to the absenc.e of 
economic interdependence. The opportunities of the latter for 
profitable investment are limited (apart from oil) to four 
industrial sectors: construction, transport, trade, and 
services. "The shortcoming of the Libyan economy ••. has 
been its failure to widen the. scope of the· modern sect:or~ .. 70 
Heitmann thinks that the absence of an entrepreneurial tra-
dition "has been a major factor in retarding the development 
of a broader-based modern economy. Unfortunately, the 
required talents and imagination are not always readily 
acquired. Gradually, however, with a widening of educational. 
opportunities, such a tradition can be expected to develop." 71 
Although Hirschman suggests the stimulation of entre-
preneurship, he seems to underestimate the role of personality 
and · institutional factors. A regime following the Hirsch-
70G. Heitmann, "Libya: An Analysis of the Oil Economy," 
The Journal of Modern African Studies VII, No. 2 (1969): 253. 
71Ibid., p. 254. 
man strategy, should invest in social overhead capital in 
order to encourage entrepreneurs, but 
the extent to which Hirschman is correct 
about the effect of strategic unbalancing 
government investments on the incentives 
of private individuals to invest can be 
demonstrated within some reasonable time 
period. . . . When connections between 
investments.and outputs are reliably estab-
lished, behavioral or cultural variables 
affecting both of these might usefully be 
explored and tested.72 
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Higgins recognized the importance of these behavioral 
and cultural variables in his study on Libya in the early 
1950's. He imputed what he calls "the problem of incentive" 
to Libyan history. During this time, "economic development 
took the form of investment by foreign colonial powers," 
without the direct participation of the indigenous Libyans 
whose interests were ignored by their foreign rulers: 73 
72 
With such a history, it is not surprising 
that most Libyans have failed to take the 
long view. To \vork or save today for bene-
fits to be obtained five, ten, or twenty 
years hence has even seemed a little fool-
ish in the light of their experience. Cer-
tainly that experience has done little to 74 
undermine the fatalism of the typical Libyan. 
!lehman and Uphoff, op. cit., pp. 265-66. 
73Higgins, op. cit., (1959 edition), p. 34. 
74
rbid., pp. 34-45. The term ."fatalism" mentioned in 
Higgin's quotation, is what Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) 
defined as "the degree to which an individual perceives a lack 
of ability to control his future." Higgins had observed a 
93· 
On the other hand, the abundance of capital in Libya's 
present economy (a fact that tempted economists to describe 
it as the capital-surplus economy and the exceptional economy 
in the developing world) 75 contrasts with Hirschman's supply-
criticism of balanced growth, where capital in Libya is not 
only adequate, but surplus. 
Higgins has expressed his skepticism of the applicability 
of unbalanced growth strategy for Libya. He is doubtful that 
expansion in one sector will generate growth in others. Hig-
gins reached the conclusion that, "so far as the Hirschman 
model is concerned, the Libyan case means that 'unbalanced' 
growth, once started, can remain unbalanced for a frighten-
ingly long time." 76 
Unfortunately, the balanced and unbalanced growth strate-
gies were defined by economic factors. Their proponents paid 
little attention to such non-economic factors as political, 
sociological, and administrative factors. Ilchman and Bhar-
gava recognized this deficiency in these strategies. They 
analyzed them in terms of the following questions which, they 
believe, are necessary in judging these strategies before 
widespread tendency to live for today and entrust the fut~re 
to Providence. Ibid., p. 35. 
75 See,.for example, Higgins (1968), El~Mallakh (1969), 
and Farley (1971) . 
76Higgins, op. cit., (1968 edition), p. 838. 
they can be considered operational: 
What is the character and membership of the 
elite? What is the degree of organization 
of two of the affected sectors--the urban 
working force and the peasantry? How 
responsive is the political system to group 
demands? What is the expected role of 
government in the strategy? How many civil 
servants will be required, and to what extent 
and in what way must they be trained?77 
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A regime adopting any of these strategies must, there-
fore, pay attention to the interests of the urban working 
class as well as the interests of the people living in the 
rural areas. This is particularly true, since "growing 
income disparities, regressive taxation, and suppression of 
the right of labor organization would probably not be accepted 
for long without unrest and • • • regional imbalances not 
remedied by the optimal investment. patte1n of balanced. 
growth strategy would be a source of di·scontent. " 78 
77 rlchman and Bhargava, op. cit., p. 27. 
78
rbid. I p. 14. 
CHAPTER V 
POPULATION PLANNING AND REGIONAL GROWTH 
1. Introduction 
Economic planning in Libya, which was made possible by 
the increasing oil revenues, has led to considerable expendi-
tures in the different sectors of the economy. But, unfor-
tunately, recent development plans do not include explicit 
goals with respect to urbanization and population distribu-
tion. Regional population policies should be part of any 
plan aimed at raising the level of the economic and social 
development of different parts of the country. In particu-
lar, the government should, through these plans, consciously 
institute measures to counteract the already existing polari-
zation processes that usually favor the two major cities of 
Tripoli and Benghazi. 
The substantial injection of oil revenues into the major 
urban centers resulted in an unprecedented increase in incomes 
and in higher standards of living. This was accompanied by a 
1 
significant increase in the level of imported goods, a sudden 
1According to J.A. Allan et al., op. cit., the total 
value of imported food and food products increased from 5 
million Libyan pounds in 1956 to 27.6 million in 1968, while 
agricultural exports declined from a value of 1.23 million 
in 1956 to only about 32,000 in 1968. 
95 
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flourishing of the various service activities, and a boom in 
the construction industry. The effect of these developments 
was a rapid drift of population from rural areas and small 
towns into the major urban centers. With this drift from 
the land, Libyan agriculture was left to decline and the 
consumer turned to foreign markets for the satisfaction of 
his daily food needs. The following table shows the changing 
place of agriculture in the national economy from 1958 to 
1967: 
TABLE 13 
The Changing Place of Agriculture 
in the National Economy: 1958-1967 
(in millions of 
1958 1962 
Total value of agri-
cultural production 20.0 17.3 
Value of food exports 2.7 1.8 
Value of food imports 5.1 8.4 
Food deficit (value) 2.4 6.6 








Source: J.A. Allan et al., Libya: Agriculture and 
Economic Development (London: Frank Cass & 
Sons, 1973). 
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The decline of the small towns may constitute a hindrance 
to effective economic development, and could be associated 
with the decline in agricultural productivity. These towns 
are markets that help to promote agricultural commercializa-
tion. They serve as· centers for the efficient exchange of 
goods and services. In addition to that, the small towns 
serve as nodes for introducing innovations and modernization 
and as community centers forthepeople living around them. 
Therefore, in order to achieve an effective economic develop-
ment and to maintain agricultural productivity, these towns 
should be developed, their integrity should be preserved, 
and they should be as accessible as possible to the people 
in their hinterlands. 
The observed gap between urban and rural areas could be 
reduced and eventually eliminated by a rational distribution 
of towns among the various regions of the country. A system 
of cities, acting as nodes of innovationandurban-related 
functions within different rural areas, is necessary for the 
efficient diffusion of modernization. An integrated urban 
hierarchy is essential to facilitating the movement of inno-
vation and modernization from the major urban centers, along 
the transportation routes, to the smaller urban centers, and 
finally into the rural areas. Furthermore, by increasing 
the number and range of services at all levels of the hier-
archy, we can stabilize the population and check the migration 
98 
of people from small towns and rural areas to the major urban 
centers, thereby avoiding urban congestion and other related 
problems. 
The aim of this final chapter is to examine the pattern 
of population distribution in northeastern Libya in terms of 
the changes that occurred in it over the period 1954-1973, 
for which data are available. This will be followed by an 
attempt to propose a future pattern of population and services 
in this region.' 
2. Population Distribution in North-
eastern Libya: 1954-1973 
An outstanding feature of northeastern Libya's popula-
tion distribution is its marked coastal concentration (Maps 
5, 6). Increasing temperature extremes and the scarcity of 
water to the south make the coast and the Jebel El Akhadar 
the most favored physical environment for productivity and 
living conditions. Three physiographic zones of population 
concentration can be identified in northeastern Libya. The 
coastal area, particularly the Benghazi Plain, contained over 
SO percent of the total population in 1973. The Jebel El-
Akhdar supported about 36 percent, while the area east of it, 
known as the Marmorica Plateau, accounted for about 10 percent. 
Map 7 shows the population change over the 1954-1964 per-
iod. Over two-thirds of the places that were recorded in the 
1954 Population Census experienced population increase. For 
MAP 5 
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most of them the increase was fast. Rapid population growth 
was experienced in both the urban and rural areas of the . 
region·. Places of rapid population growth included those in 
the rainfall zones and the richest farming areas. In 1964, 
the agricultural sector represented the largest single 
empJ:oyer, accounting'. for nearly 40 percent of .the total-labor 
force. 
The population change from 1964 to 1973 was different 
from that of the earlier decade, as it was marked by uneven-
ness. While all the large towns experienced rapid popula-
tion increases and passed from one state of rapid growth to 
another, the populations of the small towns and rural areas 
declined, most of them passing from a state of fast growth to 
fast decline in less than 10 years (Maps, 8,9). Table 14 
shows the transition between growth and decline for various 
urban and rural centers over the 1954-1973 period. Places 
that had rapidly gained population, both in 1964 and 1973, 
were the major urban centers of· Be...>J.ghazi, Beida, -Derna, ·.and 
Tobrug. These cities, with their booming construction ind-
ustries and commerce, have been the main focus of commercial 
activity. They became the receiving centers for the indi-
rect benefits from oil revenues in the past fifteen years. 
Benghazi, for example, has grown from less than 70,000 
people in 1954 to over a quarter of a million people in 1973, 
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growth was a reflection of the high rate of the population 
increase in Libya, in general, plus the heavy migration from 
other parts of the country. Thus, the cluster of economic 
activity, availability of jobs, and the generous spending 
of oil money in the major urban centers, has led to a strong 
"backwash effect" in the form of heavy out-migration from 
smaller-towns and rural areas into the major urban centers 
(Map 10). The economies of the villages and rural areas, 
which depended in the past on agriculture, have been threat-
ened by the loss of labor. This was reflected _in the decline 
of the agricultural labor from about 40 percent of the total 
labor force in 1964 to 32.5 percent in 1968 (Table 12). 
Since rural-urban migration is usually the result of dis-
parities in income, specific measures should be taken on 
the part of the government to produce a regional distribution 
of income that would lead to a more desirable population dis-
tribution. This might involve some kind of subsidization of 
rural populations in order to keep them in place during the 
second stage of development, when agriculture and manufactur-
ing will take the place of petroleum as the prime mover of 
the economy. This subsidization could be in the form of a 
higher standard of living accommodations, improved recreation 
facilities, or other urban amenities now lacking in the rural 
centers. The creation of a new center with a pleasant 
enviro=ent, or the upgrading of a:<'l old one might provide a 
·MAP 10 
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powerful stimulus to the general development of an area. As 
improvements are needed in the quality of the human environ-
ment, one might anticipate an increase in productivity. More 
important, it would contribute to the checking of rural 
migration t-o .the overcrowded urban .cent.ers. 
In the following section, an attempt is made to propose 
a future pattern of centers in order to ensure a more balanced 
distribution of population and services in northeastern Libya. 
It is only a preliminary attempt and, of course, further 
research is needed to determine whether the new and upgraded 
centers would operate efficiently, given the proposed amount 
of support. 
3. The Hierarchy of Places 
The spatial model of central places, based on the cen-
tral-place theory, asserts that a system of centers results 
from an economy that is largely devoted to trading and other 
tertiary activities, and that centers exist mainly to provide 
goods and services for surrounding areas. This system 
develops because goods and services tend to fall into grades 
each having its own range, which can be expressed in terms 
of an "upper limit," or a "lower limit," called the threshold. 
The upper limit results from spatial competition between cen-
ters of supply, or from the maximum distance that consumers 
are willing to travel in order to obtain the goods and services 
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offered a~ a location. The threshold is defined as the 
minimum population (or minimum amount of purchasing power) 
needed to support a given type of central function in order 
for it to exist at a center. 
For the distribution of different categories, or orders 
of goods and services, the theory postulates the existence of 
a hierarchy of central places. Each higher level center in 
the hierarchy provides all goods supplied from successively 
lower level centers plus a group of higher order functions 
that set it above the lower level centers in the system. 
Higher order centers have greater centrality and are more 
widely spaced than those of lower order. 
3.a. Selection of Data 
A complete list of central functions, offered by each 
of the 85 settlements in the study area, was made possible 
.during a survey of the Eastern Muhafadat in 1966. 2 They 
inclucle the different. kinds of services in each of the follow-
ing main urban functional areas--administration, communica-
tions, social services, commerce, and other services. Some 
of these services include several examples of more than one 
level of establishment, e.g., general hospitals, specialist 
2The 1966 Field survey was undertaken by Doxiadis 
Associates - Consultants on Development and Ekistics, Athens, 
G-reece. ·· 
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hospitals, and dispensaries; universities, secondary schools, 
and elementary schools. In all, information was recorded 
for twenty-four kinds of services, including thirty-seven 
different establishments (Table 15). 
Three levels of central functions (low, medium, high) 
are considered in the present study, attaching one, two, and 
three points to them, respectively (Table 16). Central func-
tions are weighted according to the following method: If the 
division of services into three was possible, as in the case 
of political administration and health services, they were 
rated on all three levels. If the services did not lend 
themselves to further division, as in the case of banks and 
clubs, the threshold size (measured as the minimum population 
needed to support a given function) has been the factor con-
sidered in classifying the functions. It should be noted 
that where a place had establishments on more than one level 
within the same service, only the highest level establishment 
was counted. Usually, as in this last case, the higher level 
establishment includes the services provided by the lower 
level ones. 
By adding up the values of the full variety of services 
in each center, weighted according to their respective levels, 
it is possible to measure the quality of its services. If a 
place scored the maximum in all the thirty-seven services, 
it obtained 60 points. Figure 1 shows the frequency distri-
FUNCTIONS 
SETTLEMENTS 
l I BENGHAZI 
2 I BEIDA 
3 I DERNAH 
4 I TOBRUG 
5 I EL MERJ 
6 I EJDABIAH 
7 I SHAHAT 
8 I MESSAH 
9 I AL GWARSHAH 
10 I EL ABIAR 
111 SUSAH 
12 I MSAID 
13 I EL CUBBAH 
14 I BENINAH 
1151 BATTAH -----1 16 SOLUG 
17 I GAMINIS 
18 I l\L FAYDIYAH 
19 I TOKRAH 
20 I DERYANAH 
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2 2 I EL MKHELLI 
23 I ZAWYAT ELARGYB 
24 I AL GEIGAB 
25 I SIDI MAHYUS 
26 I EL BARDIYAH 
27 I JARDES ELABID 




32 UM ELREZAM 
33 AL BAYADHAH 
34 TOLMETAH 
35 TAKNIS 
36 GASR LIBYA 
37 BIR ALASHNAB 
38 MARA WAH 
39 EL REJMAH 
40 EL MAGRUN 
41 FARZUGHA 
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The Weighting of Services by Level 
Service Threshold Size Points 
Administration 
(1) Political 
Muhafadah 16,000 3 
Baladiyah 5,535 2 
Sub-Baladiyah 350 1 
(2) Police and Courts 
Police Headquarters 14,000 3 
Court 1,575 2 
Police Station 350 1 
Social Services 
(3) Health Services 
General Hospital 14,000 3 
Specialist Hospital 5,200 2 
Dispensary 350 1 
(4) Education 
University or College 16,000 3 
Secondary School 2,700 2 
Elementary School 200 1 
(5) Public Library 18,700 3 
(6) Vocational School 16,000 3 
( 7) Cinema 14,000 3 
(8) CUltural Club 2,730 2 
(9) Sporting Club 2,490 2 
(10) Hotel 2,100 2 
(ll) Religious Services 
Zawia 600 l 
Koranic School 350 1 
Mosque 200 1 
116 
Communications 
(12) Bus Service 14,000 3 
(13) Posts & Telecommunication 
Telephone Exchange 2, 730 2 
Post Office 2,000 2 
(14) Service Station 2,100 2 
Commerce 
(15) Banks 14,000 3 
(16) Wholesale Trade 14,000 3 
(17) Retail Trade 
Cloth Stores 2,150 2 
Meat Stores 1,500 2 
General Stores 200 1 
(18) Animal Market 1,300 2 
Other Services 
(19) Veterinary 1,300 2 
(20) Slaughterhouse 1,500 2 
(21) Grain Storage 945 1 
(22) Bakery 800 1 
(23) Electricity 200 1 
(24) Piped water 200 1 
117 
bution of the 85 centers according to the quality of their 
services, as measured by scores ranging from l to 60. 
Table 17 shows the distribution of all the centers 
among the following grades: 
Grade I Over 60 points 
" II From 50 to 59 " 
" III " 40 to 49 " 
" IV " 30 to 39 " 
" v " 20 to 29 " 
" VI " 10 to 19 " 
" VII " l to 9 " 
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TABLE 17 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CENTERS AMONG GRADES 
Grade Score MUHAFADAT 
Benghazi Jebel El Akhadar De rna 
I Benghazi 
II 59 De rna 
57 Beida 
54 Tobrug 
III 47 El Merj 
45 Ejdabia 
IV 35 Shahat 
34 El Abiar 
v 29 Susah 




20 So lug 
VI 19 Tokrah Battah 
Faydiya 
17 El Bayada Msaid 
16 Jardes El Abid Urn El Rezam 
15 Takinis 
14 Mar tuba 
13 El Gwarsha Geigab 
El Hagrun 
12 T01meita Labreg 
11 Bir E1 Gandula 
Salunta 
10 Deryana Marawa Bir El Ashhab 
Girnada 
El Haniya 
Omar El Hukhtar 
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TABLE 1::/ (cont.) 
VII 9 Sidi Mahyus Karnboot 
Ayn Mara 
8 El Mletania Gasr Libya El Bardiya 
El Rejme Farzuga 
Jar dina 
El Kuefya 




6 Sidi Khalifa El Debbusia Ayn ElGhazala 
El Hmeda Safsaf El Adem. 
5 Tika El Atrun 
El Nawaghia Gasr El Jedi 
Ras El Hila! 
4 Bersis Sidi Buzeid 
Satatah 
3 Gabr Jira Al Awilia Marsa Luk 
El Bnayah Zawyat Zanzur 
Jardes Jarrar Morsas 
2 El Mabni Markez El Ghabat El Bumbah 





1 Tansulukh Sidi Khalid 
Um El Gdeyh 
3.b. The Existing Pattern 
of Major Centers 
121 
The present spatial structure in northeastern Libya is 
largely built around the three Muhafadah capitals, which are 
also the three outstanding service centers that fall into 
grades I and II. They are: 
Benghazi - The only grade I center of the region, its main 
port, and the seat of one of the only two universities in 
the whole country. It will undoubtedly continue to play its 
role as the commercial, educational, and administrative capi-
tal of the region. The location of the international port 
and airport and the already accumulated commercial, recre-
ational, educational, and other higher-order functions, guar-
antee this expectation. 
Derna - Was until a few years ago, and still is in many 
respects, the only other real urbaJJ. center in northeastern 
Libya after Benghazi. It has a long history of urban life 
and a strong tradition as an administrative and educational 
center. 
Beida - Was established during the monarchy regime as the 
national capital. However, it lost its national administr.a-
tive functions after the 1969 revolution. Its future role 
will be that of an educational center as it is the seat of a 
new university college. In addition, it will perform the 
functions of the Muhafadah capital. On the present criteria, 
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both Derna and Beida are classified as grade II centers. 
In addition to the three Muhafadah capitals that consti-
tute the main foci around which the present spatial structure 
in northeastern Libya is built, there are the three Baladiya 
capitals of Tobrug, Merj, and Ejdabia. Tobrug is classed as 
a grade II center, while Merj and Ejdabia are classed as 
grade III centers. Their areas of influence consist of a 
number of rural villages that are dependent on the Baladiya 
capital for such higher-order functions as secondary educa-
tion, health services, and administration. 
Within each area of influence of the grade II and III 
centers, we can distinguish the existence of certain villages 
of the grade IV and V types that perform higher-order func-
tions for a number of other villages (mainly small centers of 
the grade VI and VII types). Such higher-order functions 
are largely commercial. Nevertheless, sometimes they are 
also administrative, as in the case of the Sub-Baladiyas 
seats, or even educational (villages with secondary boarding 
schools). At present, however, the dependence of the vari-
ous small centers on such grade IV and V centers is not very 
great. For the majority of functions, each grade VI and VII 
center depends directly on the respective Baladiya center. 
3.c. The Proposed Pattern 
of Major Centers 
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As an aid for considering the future pattern, Map 11 
shows circles around each existing and proposed grade II and 
III centers. The radius of 40 km. (25 miles) is based on the 
present spacing of major centers in northeastern Libya. 
Whether a new center is proposed depends on the following 
considerations: 
1) a minimum population required to support the func-
tions of a higher grade center; and 
2) the specific geographic and economic features of the 
area. 
The following list shows the estimated service area 
populations of each existing major center, except Benghazi. 
These estimates are based on the 1973 preliminary results of 
the General Population Census: 
Beida 80,000 
De rna 70,000 
Tobrug 60,000 
El Merj 60,000 
Ejdabia 52,000 
In proposing a future pattern we have to keep in mind 
the minimum population required to support a grade III center. 
The lowest estimate of a population served by any of the 
existing centers is 52,000--the minimum estimate for Ejdabia. 
MAP 11 
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All parts of northeastern Libya could be considered in the 
following order: 
(1) The Benghazi Plain and the Gebel El Akhdar, 
(2) The oil region around Ejdabiah, 
(3) The areas east of the Gebel El Akhdar (between Dernah 
and the Egyptian border) . 
In the most populous part of the Benghazi Plain and the 
Gebel El Akhdar there are two obvious gaps in the distribu-
tion of major centers. The first is between Benghazi and 
Beida. The only grade III center that exists between the two 
is El Merj, which lies in the most important agricultural 
region in northeastern Libya. El Merj already has enough 
services to qualify as a grade II center. The surrounding 
fertile plain of El Merj will give it the basis to become a 
' flourishing major center. It could serve an area with a 
population of some 75,000. This is the average popualation 
of Beida and Dernah, the existing two grade II centers. 
The second gap in the distribution of major centers is 
between Benghazi and Ejdabia. There exist, between the two, 
only two grade V centers and one grade VI center. The best 
place for a new grade III center along the Benghazi-Ejdabiah 
road would be El Magrun, the existing grade VI center. Its 
location on the main road and its distance from Benghazi would 
justify the assumption that it would become a grade II center 
with a population of some 50,000 people, the minimum estimate 
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of the grade III centers. 
In the oil region, the only grade III center that serves 
the petroleum hinterland is Ejdabiah. It was the first urban 
center to feel the impact of petroleum exploration and pro-
duction in a direct way. It serves the role of a Baladiyah 
capital, but its recent growth and the key to its role is 
associated with petroleum developments. Its location on the 
intersection of the coastal road, with the routes leading to 
the oases of the South, makes it an important transport 
nodal point. The development of the two oil terminals of 
Marsa el Bregah and Zwitinah near Ejdabiah will have an 
impact upon it; in the form of demand for various services. 
Because of its location, Ejdabiah has all the basic prerequi-
sites for developing into a grade II center, supporting a 
service area of some 80,000 people (about one and a half times 
the population of its present service area). 
Marsa el Bregah is a possible site for creating a grade 
III center in the oil region. It represents the largest con-
centration of industrial investment in northeastern Libya. 
Existing potentialities at El Bregah promise that it will 
develop into a grade III center. Therefore, its population 
growth should be encouraged in order to reach the minimum 
population required to support its proposed grade III func-
tions. 
In the areas east of the Jebel El Akhdar the only grade 
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II center between Derna and the Egyptian border is Tobrug. 
Tobrug is the second town in northeastern Libya to feel the 
impact of the petroleum activities in a direct manner. The 
construction of the 500 km. long oil pipeline from the Serir 
oil field to the oil terminal of Marsa Hariga near Tobrug 
has already provided a strong stimulus for .the growth of 
its economy in recent years. The potentialities of its com-
mercial port, an excellent deep-water harbor and its p~oximi­
ty to the major port of Benghazi, will help to increase its 
development and enable the town to support more people than 
the population of its present service area. 
There will still be two gaps in the distribution of the 
grade III pattern in this part of northeastern Libya, east 
of Derna. One is between Derna and Tobrug, and the other 
is between the latter and the Egyptian border. Two grade III 
centers will be needed in this part, and Kamboot and El 
.Tamimi may grow to perform this function. These tvro centers 
are well situated to serve the areas east and west of Tobrug, 
as well as to support the minimum population required for · 
their proposed new grades. 
Figure 2 shows the results of the regression analysis of 
the 1966 population of the centers along with their respec-
tive scores. Deviations from the regression line indicate 
that some centers had more functions than would be expected 
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scores indicate. Examples of the former group of places 
include the tourist centers of Shahat and Susa, and the 
border town of Msaid. These centers cater to non-resident 
populations. 
The towns of El Merj and Beida also lie below the 
regression line. El Merj experienced a severe earthquake in 
1963 that destroyed a great part of the town and forced the 
majority of the people to leave and relocate in Benghazi and 
Derna. Beida's high score of functions was due to the rise 
of its political status, established during the monarchy 
regime, as the national capital. 
Solug is the only center which showed a high deviation 
above the regression line. It had more people than expected 
from its low score of functions. 
3.d. Intermediate Centers 
The following are the characteristics of the growth and 
decline of some of the intermediate centers that fall within 
grades IV and V: 
El Abiar 
Average· Annual· 
Year Population Rate. of Change (%) 
'1954 8,612 
1964 14,260 6.5 
1973 10,315 -3.1 
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The settlement of El Abiar has always been the center of 
the surrounding agricultural region. In addition to the 
administrative' and commercial functions that it serves f"or the 
surrounding villages, it is also an important educational 
center. It has the largest boarding school in northeastern 
Libya, the service area extending far beyond the town's nor-
mal area of influence. 
Since El Abiar's role is connected with the surrounding 
agricultural region, which will be a part of the primary 
forces of economic growth in the future, its population 
decline should be stopped (it lost about. 4,000 people be~neen 
1964 and 1973) . The people who have already migrated from 
the town and settled mainly in Benghazi should be encouraged 
to return to their town. In this respect, the addition of 
more functions of higher order would be a good incentive. 
So lug 
Average· Annual . ' 







The very high decrease of its population (nearly half 
of its population during the 1964-1973 period) must be asso-
cia ted with the attraction of the urban centers and the oil 
activities. It is, after all, in close proximity to both 
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Benghazi and the oil region. However, its economy depends 
on animal husbandry and agriculture. According to 1960 
Agricultural Census, Solug was the richest cereal-producing 











Rate of Change(%) 
-2.9 
There was a very slight population decrease between the 
1954-1964 period. However, the rate of decrease has grown 
during the 1964-1973 period, reaching the level of almost 
3.0% annually. This decrease is apparently due to emigration 
to Benghazi, where employment opportunities are available. 
The settlement lies in the biggest cereal-producing area 











Rate of Change(%) 
12.2 
3.7 
In addition to its role as the center of an agricultural 
area, Beninah is also an important air transportation center, 
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serving Benghazi and the eastern part of Libya. Its trans-
portation activity will continue to expand, especially as 
domestic air services increase, and it will influence 











Rate of Change(%) 
5.1 
3.5 
The role of Shahat is currently restricted below its 
potentialities. The natural beauty of the area, the excel-
lent climate, and the many archeological treasures of Shahat 
could undoubtedly make it a major tourist attraction, acti-
vating a large scale center of services in this area. How-
ever, the present main function of the settlement is limited 
to that of a local commercial and administrative center. 
Shahat, as well as other settlements in the area that 
possess similar touristic potentialities, should have more 
and varied central functions. Shahat's future role as the 
major pole of touristic attraction in Libya will acquire 
increasing importance when the Libyan economy reGrients 










The demographic evolution of Susah seems to indicate 
that its population declined during the period 1954-1964, 
while bett~een 1964 and 197 3 it experienced an increase of 6. 0 
percent per year. The construction of the new capital of 
Beida, a pole of attraction, could justify a slight movement 
of the population of Susah towards this larger urban center 
with its better jobs. Susah should have more and varied 
central functions to serve its future role as a tourist cen-
ter. It has the impressive remnants of its ancient history, 
in addition to the sea and its many beaches. 
Gubbah 
Average Annual 






Gubbah experienced a higher population increase during 
the earlier decade of 1954-1964 than during the 1964-1973 
period. The explanation for these developments may lie in 
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the fact that, during the later period, the effects of the 
current oil boom have been widely felt. This has come in 
the form of more employment opportunities and higher wages 
in the urban centers. In addition, the urban centers have 
attracted the rural populations, as opposed to the 1954-
1964 period when agriculture was still providing the great-
est part of the country's economic base. Thus, during 
recent years, the natural grovrth of the population has been 
reduced by the migration towards the urban centers, which 
offer employment opportunities in sectors other than farming 
or livestock. 
3.e. Summary Notes 
In view of the fact that the oil prosperity is expected 
to last only a few decades, based as it is on the exploita-
tion of a non-renewable resource, the economy should be 
planned for a smooth transition from this oil phase to the 
next phase, when agriculture and manufacturing will provide 
the primary forces of the economy. The particular population 
distribution, resulting from current economic conditions, may 
not be suitable for this eventual economic pattern. The 
development of agricul tu::.·e, manufachll'ing, and tou:rism may- call 
for the existence of a relatively large manpower component 
in the small urban and rural settlements of the country. 
If the migration of the rural population to Benghazi and 
135 
other urban centers continues unchecked, based on short-term 
expectations, then the transition from the present pattern 
of a petroleum-dominated economy to that of a more diversi-
fied one will not be smooth. One can anticipate a critical 
period of maladjustment. 
In view of the above, it is necessary that proper poli-
cies, based on long term expectations, be devised. These 
policies must be designed for a balanced distribution of 
population through the region of northeastern Libya. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUM..'1ARY AND CONCLUDING REHARKS 
One of the primary interests of the geographer, regard-
ing the problem of economic development, arises from the 
fact that sectoral imbalance invariably has a spatial mani-
festation. Therefore, the problem of correcting the sec-
toral imbalance has an important counterpart in regional 
development and planning. The reversal of regional imbal-
ance becomes a complex problem because the polarizing pro-
cess is historically conditioned and is deeply ingrained 
into the structural economy. Accordingly, it has been our 
argument that a study of regional development must begin 
with a historical analysis. 
In the Libyan case our research pointed to the fact 
that the dominance of the towns along the Mediterranean 
water front began as far back as the period of Greek and 
Roman activity. The confinement of effective life space 
to the narrow coastal margin continued under the Arabs, 
the Turks, and the Italians. 
In the interior there emerged another economy based 
on nomadism with very different attitudes, beliefs, and 
life styles. Hmvever, this economy was too sparse to 
flourish independently and it always remained in the shadow 
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of metropolitan coastal dominance. An understanding of the 
historical evolution of these regional economic relations 
is essential for the contemporary purposes of formulating 
development plans for modern Libya. 
The oil boom of the Sixties and the revenues accruing 
to Libya showed a pattern of flow which essentially con~ 
firmed -the historicaJ. grain of the space economy, Specifically, 
the oil industry in Libya exhibited characteristics similar 
to the mining economies in that it was developed in an 
enclave model. Given the weakness of the nomadic base of 
the traditional economy, the net effect was a mass exodus 
from the interior to the coast. Given the fact that oil 
is an extractive economy of a nonrenewable resource, I feel 
that it is most important that the mining of oil should be 
accompanied by dispersed industrial and agricultural activi-
ties. 
An awareness on the part of the Government concerning 
these issues has resulted in a substantial investment in 
infrastructure for the interior regions. But, unfortunately, 
such fiscal and investment policies has not been accompanied 
by the formulation or the implementation of a rational, 
regional policy of population. For example, schools 
were built in virtually empty and emptying areas. 
These questions led us to analyze the population data 
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in Libya in order to identify the growing and declining 
regions. This analysis was supplemented by the spatial 
analysis of hierarchical service-centers in order that we 
could identify the gaps in space and in the hierarchical 
order. The results of this investigation were used to 
suggest a settlement policy for northeastern Libya. 
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